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I. INTRODUCTION
Free speech law often protects emotional expression.1 However, we
lack an understanding of the scope and limits of protection for
emotional expression. This Essay seeks to make progress toward such
an understanding. A better comprehension of the nature of emotion
2itself is crucial to achieving this goal. A better grasp of the logic of
emotional expression is also important. 3  If we can arrive at an
improved understanding of emotions and how they can be expressed,
we will be better able to explain when we do-and do not-
constitutionally protect the expression of emotion.4 We will be better
able to account for inconsistent or unsatisfactory judicial decisions, as
well.5
This Essay does not suggest that a better understanding of emotional
expression will allow us to dramatically simplify free speech law.
Emotions are surprisingly complex, and the expression of emotion is
similarly complex. 6  Remarkably, emotions and the logic of their
expression turn out to be no less complex than, and no narrower than,
the full range of speech in general for free speech purposes. 7 Emotional
expression and the logic thereof is not a special, discrete, or narrow
category of speech. Instead, emotional expression and its logic already
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.
1. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). See generally infra Part 11
(discussing recurring patterns of emotional expression and their legal status).
2. See infra Part III.A (discussing theories and definitions of emotion).
3. See infra Part III.B (discussing the emotivism model and interaction between speakers and
listeners).
4. See infra Part IV (analyzing patterns of emotional expression using an emotion-based
approach).
5. See infra Part IV (analyzing patterns of emotional expression using an emotion-based
approach).
6. See infra Parts 1II, IV (applying an emotion-based analysis to certain emotional
expressions).
7. See infra Parts III, IV (applying an emotion-based analysis to certain emotional
expressions).
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imply and encompass -all of the major elements, forms, values, limits,
and problems associated with freedom of speech. A theory of free
speech for emotional speech can thus serve as a theory for free speech
in general.
Let us begin by noticing just a few of the uncertainties attending the
case law of emotional expression. The classic "fighting words" case of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire8 is largely about emotion. The Supreme
Court in Chaplinsky famously observed that "'[r]esort to epithets or
personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information
or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a
criminal act would raise no question under that instrument."'
9
It is fair to suppose that "[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse"10 is
typically accompanied by some sort of emotion on the part of the
speaker. But the Court's main focus in Chaplinsky, in the context of
"fighting words","1 is on the emotional reactions of listeners, not
speakers. 12 "Fighting words" are "those which by their utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."' 3  The
emotional injury-in this instance, the emotional impulse to fight-is
inflicted upon the listener, whatever the speaker's emotional state.
1 4
8. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
9. Id. at 572 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 572-73.
12. See id. at 573 (discussing how "fighting words" violate the Constitution by sparking
violent emotional response in listeners, such as causing a fight).
13. Id. at 572.
14. This proposition is not to suggest that the emotional reactions of listeners are irrelevant to
a speech's free speech value. The Court has held, for example, that freedom of speech may be at
its most valuable when it "stirs people to anger." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989)
(flag burning regulation case) (quoting Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)
(rabble-rousing emotional oration case)). Additionally, "even when a speaker or writer is
motivated by hatred or ill will his expression [is] protected by the First Amendment." Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (libel and intentional infliction of emotional
distress case) (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (criminal libel prosecution
case)). We can easily imagine that an emotional reaction in a listener could be stirred by speech
involving no particular emotion on the part of the speaker or by speech reflecting emotion on the
part of the speaker, whether the speaker's and the listener's emotions correspond or not. For
example, a largely dispassionate traffic report might provoke strong emotions in some listeners.
Similarly, emotionally proud or celebratory speech might provoke anger or disgust on the part of
some listeners.
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The later Supreme Court epithet case of 'Cohen v. California15
focused more directly on the emotions of speakers, as opposed to those
of listeners. 16 Justice Harlan observed for the Court in Cohen that:
(M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it
conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached
explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact,
words are often chosen as much for their emotive as for their cognitive
force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while
solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no
regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may
often be the more important element of the overall message sought to
be communicated. 17
In this passage from Cohen, more than a single distinction may be in
play. This passage can be read as creating a distinction between the
expression of ideas and the expression of emotions. However, Justice
Harlan drew a more literal contrast between precise, detachedly
expressible ideas and either emotions in general or some subclass of
emotions. 18  "[O]therwise inexpressible emotions" 19 may refer to
emotions that cannot be expressed without recourse to arguably
offensive epithets. Perhaps Justice Harlan was suggesting that some
combination of intense feeling and difficulty in otherwise articulating
one's views leads to emotionally charged epithets.
It would be odd, after all, to assume that emotions could never be
accurately expressed in a precise, detached way. In some cases, we can
almost perfectly articulate an emotion, as in our envy of a rival's
success in some competitive activity. The strength or weakness of our
envy need not affect how well we convey that emotion. On the other
hand, there are a number of non-emotional subjects, such as what it is
like for an object to be green in color, which are difficult to articulate.
Justice Harlan also contrasted the cognitive force, or the cognitive
content, of an expression with its emotive force, or its emotive
15. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (discussing an allegedly offensive epithet, in
connection with the military draft, written on a jacket worn, or at least carried into, a courthouse
building).
16. See id. at 26 (noting that speakers often choose their words specifically to express their
emotions). See generally Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor
Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J.
283, 302-03 (arguing that tolerating offensive speech has public value in that offensive speech or
language reveals the important social fact of the harboring, by some, of offensive thoughts or
beliefs).
17. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26; see also, e.g., Gilles v. State, 531 N.E.2d 220, 226 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989) (Miller, J., dissenting) (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26).
18. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
19. Id.
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function. However," Justice Harlan did not explain whether "force,""content," and "function" were all somehow equivalent or related in
some other way.2 1  Neither did Justice Harlan reveal whether he
intended to distinguish generally between cognition and emotion. 22
Moreover, we must wonder how Justice Harlan saw any relationships
among emotion, the expression of emotion in language, and what he
referred to as the emotive force or emotive function of language. More
simply, what is the relationship between "emotion" and "emotive"? Is
the emotive merely the carrying over or the product of the emotion in
speech? Could speech be emotional in some way distinct from its
emotive force, function, or meaning? Harlan again left this distinction
unclear.
Consider one possible interpretation of the relationship between
emotion and the emotive. The twentieth century emotivist moral
philosopher, Charles L. Stevenson, explained that "[t]he emotive
meaning of a word is the power that the word acquires, on account of its
history in emotional situations, to evoke or directly express attitudes, as
distinct from describing or designating them." 23 Although Stevenson
links emotion to emotive meaning, his main interest seemed to be in the
differences between expressing, as opposed to merely describing,
reporting, or designating, one's attitudes. 4  Stevenson's interests here
may or may not match those of Justice Harlan.
It is thus fair to say that Justice Harlan's discussion of emotion and
the emotive in Cohen raises more questions than it answers. Let us turn,
then, from Justice Harlan's discussion in Cohen to the broader case law
20. Id.
21. See id. (noting that speakers choose their words for their emotive and cognitive force and
that the Constitution protects the cognitive content of such words, yet wondering whether the
Constitution protects the emotive functions of words).
22. Id. Justice Harlan often considered the emotive element of speech, as somehow
distinguished from the cognitive element, the more important element, not just from the speaker's
standpoint, but from that of constitutional values more generally. See id. Justice Harlan extolled
"'the right to criticize public men and measures-and that mean[t] not only informed and
responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation."' Id. (quoting
Justice Frankfurter in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944)). However,
this conclusion fails to clarify whether uninformed, irresponsible speech results mainly from
cognitive defects, or emotional excesses and inadequacies.
23. CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 33 (1960).
24. Id. Our use of the basic emotivist paradigm need not rely on any distinctions among
expressing and reporting or describing one's attitudes. See generally infra Part III.B (discussing
the emotivism model), Part IV (applying an emotion-based analysis to specific cases), and Part V
(summarizing the impact of this free speech model). The various necessary additions to and
complications of the basic emotivist paradigms complicate, but do not deeply affect, the overall
free speech analysis.
[Vol. 34
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addressing the protection of emotional speech under the First
Amendment. We must comprehend where the law generally protects
emotional speech, where the law does not generally protect emotional
speech, and where the law seems uncertain or controversial. Then, with
the basis of a better grasp of emotion and the logic of emotional
expression, we should be in a better position to account for both the
achievements and confusions of the free speech law of emotion. 25
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION: SOME
RECURRING PATTERNS
A. Oral Speech and Accusations of Disorderly Conduct
Much, if not all, classic political speech of the highest constitutional
value expresses, reports, or somehow evokes emotion in the speaker or
the audience. 26  However, the nature, logic, and status of emotional
expression may not be best studied in the classic political speech cases.
This is because classic political speech, at least initially, seems more
multi-faceted and complex than what we may consider more purely
emotional speech. We must, of course, not prejudge the nature of
emotion. Emotion and its expression may well turn out to be more
complex than we imagine. But for the moment, let us assume some
difference between the emotional and the cognitive or propositional. 27
Some might then imagine that classic political speech is more
structurally complex than, or otherwise distinct from, what might be
taken to be "pure" emotional speech.
In order to avoid this possible complication, let us focus on speech of
a relatively pure or strongly emotional character, with or without any
standard political message. There are certainly a number of such cases
under the general heading of Chaplinsky-style28 "fighting words" or oral
disorderly conduct cases. In such cases, the speaker, and often one or
25. See infra Part IV (applying an emotion-based analysis to specific cases).
26. For a sampling of classic instances, see, for example, Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter
from Birmingham Jail, in LEGAL AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY
TEXTS AND COMMENTARY 41 (R. George Wright ed., 1992); Plato, Crito, in LEGAL AND
POLITICAL OBLIGATION CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY TEXTS AND COMMENTARY, supra, at 1;
Henry David Thoreau, On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, in LEGAL AND POLITICAL
OBLIGATION CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY TEXTS AND COMMENTARY, supra, at 25.
27. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Harlan's distinction
between emotional and cognitive in Cohen).
28. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis of "fighting
words" in Chaplinsky).
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more listeners, are nothing if not emotional. Often, but not always,29
the listener-target in such "fighting words" cases is a police officer
trained to restrain his or her own emotional responses to verbal
provocation. The verbal provocation in such cases often reflects a
highly charged emotional state of the eventual arrestee. 31
Certainly, many of the emotionally charged "fighting words" cases
make judicial sense, as the courts are often sensitive to the nuances of
29. Compare, e.g., Nichols v. Chacon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (W.D. Ark. 2000) (holding that a
middle finger gesture does not constitute "fighting words" in an action against an arresting
officer); City of St. Paul v. Morris, 104 N.W.2d 902, 903 (Minn. 1960) (holding, in a relatively
early case, that use of "foul, vulgar, and obscene expressions," by a defendant against a police
officers who had arrested the defendant's half brother constituted "disorderly conduct," over the
dissent of Justice Loevinger); Brendle v. City of Houston, 759 So. 2d 1274 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)
(finding arrestee-defendant's use of profane language not within the scope of "fighting words"
regarding the arresting officer); People v. Bacon, 340 N.E.2d 465 (N.Y. 1975) (mem.) (finding
insufficient evidence of intent to harass police officer based on "abusive and obscene" language
directed at officer, as necessary for conviction under Penal Law § 240.25(2)); Commonwealth v.
Hock, 728 A.2d 943 (Pa. 1999) (finding that defendant's single profane remark to police officer
while walking away did not constitute "fighting words"), with, e.g., Shoemaker v. State, 38
S.W.3d 350 (Ark. 2001) (finding derogatory and insulting language directed at public school
teacher not constitutionally prohibitable under a broad statute criminalizing such comments to a
teacher irrespective of time and place, and where not all such language would amount to "fighting
words"); State v. Hammersley, 10 P.3d 1285 (Idaho 2000) (upholding a conviction where
defendant's language contained or expressed no socially or politically important message and was
targeted at a specific individual solely for abusive and derogatory purposes); People v. Dietze,
549 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1989) (finding a "threat statute," a statute punishing the use of "abusive"
language with the intent to "harass" or "annoy," unconstitutionally overbroad because only
speech that presents a clear and present danger of some serious substantive evil may be
proscribed); People v. Yablov, 706 N.Y.S.2d 591 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2000) (finding insufficient
evidence of statutory harassment based on a series of phone calls and messages including an
indefinite threat); Hershfield v. Commonwealth, 417 S.E.2d 876 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that
insulting or profane comments from a distance and across a chain link fence were not within the
scope of the face-to-face "fighting words" proscription); State v. Reyes, 700 P.2d 1155 (Wash.
1985) (en banc) (concluding that a statute prohibiting use of vulgar, insulting, or abusive
language was vague and overbroad where there was no limitation to words substantially
disruptive of a school's legitimate functions).
30. For the standards particularly applicable to law enforcement officers, see, for example,
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987) (noting that Houston's ordinance prohibits not
only obscene language directed at police officers, but also prohibits any language that "in any
manner... interrupt[s]," an officer); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974)
(finding New Orleans's ordinance overbroad because the ordinance prohibited "opprobrious
language" directed at police officers and such language does not fall within the definition of
"fighting words"); see also Dawn Christine Egan, "Fighting Words" Doctrine: Are Police
Officers Held to a Higher Standard, or per Bailey v. State, Do We Expect No More From Our
Law Enforcement Officers than We Do from the Average Arkansan?, 52 ARK. L. REV. 591 (1999)
(discussing Arkansas's statute prohibiting speech likely to "provoke a violent or disorderly
response," and its application on Arkansas police officers).
31. See, e.g., State v. Suiter, No. 25783, 2001 WL 1002069, at *6 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 4,
2001) ("By the nature of their duties, officers regularly have contact with citizens who are in
highly emotional states or who have been affected by the use of alcohol or drugs.").
2003] An Emotion-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech 435
the situation and circumstances; cultural and contextual realities; place
and time; the identities, capacities, and limitations of the parties; and the
varied shadings of the social meanings of language. However, even if
the emotional "fighting words" cases often make sense, they certainly
do not explicitly embody a satisfactory theory of the freedom and
regulation of emotional expression.
How, then, do the courts analyze emotional speech in the disorderly
conduct cases? One extended analysis of such speech concluded that:
[C]urses, oaths, expletives, execrations, imprecations, maledictions,
and the whole vocabulary of insults are not intended or susceptible of
literal interpretation. They are expressions of annoyance and
hostility-nothing more. To attach greater significance to them is
stupid, ignorant, or naive. Their significance is emotional, and it is
not merely immeasurable but also variable. The emotional quality of
exclamations varies from time to time, from region to region, and as
between social, cultural, and ethnic groups.
This analysis seems to avoid the error of assuming that such
emotional expression will typically lack value and constitute no
essential part of any expression of ideas,33 while also avoiding the
opposite error of assuming that every emotional outburst must bear
otherwise inarticulate social meaning, expressing with authenticity and
intensity the depths of the speaker's being. Not all emotional outbursts
need be unduly romanticized.
The courts also often recognize that the constitutional status of an
emotional insult 34 may depend not only on particular circumstances and
relations but also on the changing sensibilities, including increased or
decreased sensitization, of the broader society.35  Put perhaps too
strongly by one court, "[i]t is not the definition of the words that has
evolved over time, it is the 'sensibilities' of our society that has [sic]
32. Hershfield v. Commonwealth, 417 S.E.2d 876, 881 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (Benton, J..
concurring) (quoting City of St. Paul v. Morris. 104 N.W. 902, 910 (Minn. 1960) (Loevinger, J.,
dissenting)).
33. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (finding that lewd, obscene,
profane, libelous, and insulting utterances are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas"); see
also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (citing the language of Chaplinsky, but
holding unconstitutional an ordinance that in effect proscribed some but not all constitutionally
unprotected "fighting words" on a constitutionally invidious basis). For application, see, for
example, Nichols v. Chacon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1103-04 (W.D. Ark. 2000).
34. One court has defined "insult" as "an act or speech of insolence or contempt." State v.
Reyes, 700 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Wash. 1985) (en banc). The court in Reyes goes on to conclude that
"[miany insults, then, cannot be categorized as 'fighting words' because these insolent,
contemptuous words are not inherently likely to lead to a breach of peace." Id.
35. Brendle v. City of Houston, 759 So. 2d 1274, 1284 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
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changed. 36 At the very least, the courts seem to take the meaning, or
lack of meaning, of emotional outbursts as reflecting both the state of
mind and intent of the speaker 37 and the likely, if not actual, 38
understandings and reactions of listeners.
However, courts do not uniformly protect emotional outbursts as
speech for constitutional purposes. Consider, for example, the case of
State v. Suiter,39 in which a citizen speaking with a courthouse records
officer regarding a fraudulent check case became frustrated to the point
of addressing a single profanity at the officer.40  In Suiter, the Idaho
Court of Appeals distinguished Cohen4 1 on several grounds. First, the
oral character of Suiter's brief statement made it impossible for the
several listeners to avoid hearing the entire message for its full
duration. 42 Second, Suiter's profane epithet, while involving the same
objectionable language as in Cohen, was directed by Suiter at the
particular officer,43 as opposed to the world in general, which would
have been less offensive. Third, Suiter's epithet was considered to be"personally provocative and insulting." 44 Notably, the epithet made no
reference to the officer's race or any other personal or group identity.
Fourth, in contrast to Cohen,45 there was evidence in Suiter that some
persons present actually objected to Suiter's language.46
Fifth, and most fundamentally, the court in Suiter concluded that"unlike the speech in Cohen, Suiter's speech in this case conveyed no
message of political or social importance. Thus, Suiter's statement to
the officer did not contain an essential element of the expression of
36. Id.
37. See Nichols, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1103-04 (citing Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 668, 674 (8th
Cir. 1997)).
38. See id. at 1104 (quoting Burnham, 119 F.3d at 674) ("Nonverbal conduct constitutes
speech if it is intended to convey a particularized message and the likelihood is great that the
message will be understood by those who view it, regardless of whether it is actually understood
in a particular instance in such a way.").
39. State v. Suiter, No. 25783, 2001 WL 1002069 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2001).
40. See id. at * 1.
41. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text (discussing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15(1971)).
42. Suiter, 2001 WL 1002069, at *4. However, the fact that Suiter's epithet was not further
repeated could be said to minimize, if not eliminate, any problem of continuing, inescapable,
unwanted, ongoing "bombardment" speech. Id.
43. See id.
44. Id. (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20).
45. Apart, of course, from the bailiff or arresting officer in Cohen. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
46. Suiter, 2001 WL 1002069, at *4. Of course, mere offensiveness or objectionability of
language does not withdraw it from free speech protection. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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ideas that was entitled to constitutional protection." 47 According to the
court, "the unprotected features of the words are essentially a nonspeech
element of communication subject to state regulation because they
constitute no essential part of any exposition of ideas."48 Thus, in the
case of a generalized, impersonal, profane utterance directed in
emotional frustration at a law enforcement officer, where the risk of
violent reaction was almost non-existent,49  Suiter indicates that
emotional speech is not only unprotected speech, but also not even
speech itself for purposes of the free speech clause.50 The Suiter court
concluded, "such a personally[511 provocative epithet, delivered in the
manner and setting here, cannot be reasonably interpreted as the
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution.' 52
The epithet employed in Cohen was, certainly, linked to a
controversial national political institution-the military draft.53  The
same epithet, in Suiter, was linked not to any such institution, but to
Suiter's frustration with the policies of, or degree of cooperation shown
by, the officers in the discharge of their official duties. 5" Certainly, the
message in Cohen, however vague, was national in scope, whereas the
less contextually vague message in Suiter was of less than national
policy scope. Regardless, this fact would hardly show that Suiter did
not intend to convey a distinct message on that lesser policy scale.5 5
There is nothing special about the general lines of analysis in the
Suiter appellate opinion. Other cases on different facts could be cited as
47. Suiter, 2001 WL 1002069, at *4; see Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 ("[Sluch utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas ...."); State v. Hammersley, 10 P.3d 1285, 1288-89
(Idaho 2000) (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572) ("[Plersonal abuse cannot be reasonably
interpreted as the communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution.").
48. Suiter, 2001 WL 1002069, at *2 (citing Hammersley, 10 P.3d at 1288).
49. Two other officers were present, and no potential allies of Suiter were present. See id. at
*1.
50. See id. at *2.
51. The epithet in question, of a generalized faux sexual nature, however, cannot be
interpreted as making even the mildest invidious reference to the personal status or group identity
of any addressee, or anyone else.
52. Suiter, 2001 WL 1002069, at *4. Accordingly, "Suiter's statement fell within the area of
speech previously recognized as unprotected by the First Amendment." Id.
53. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
54. Suiter, 2001 WL 1002069, at *1.
55. See Nichols v. Chacon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1103-04 (W.D. Ark. 2000) (citing Burnham
v. lanni, 119 F.3d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1997)) (stating that a gesture can be just as effective as
spoken words).
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56well. Without a doubt, the generality of language varies from case to
case, as does the logic of the choice of abusive words. Two important
points must be borne in mind. First, the generality or specificity of
words does not always dictate their political significance. What seems
superficially like a personal grievance expressed to an agent of
oppression may take on a broader meaning in a political context. For
example, a complaint by Rosa Parks regarding bus seating arrangements
should be equally a matter of free speech whether or not the focus of her
remarks is narrowly personal in a literal sense.57
Second, when a citizen has freely taken the initiative in addressing a
public official, we should be reluctant to conclude that the citizen's
language is being used "with the sole purpose of being derogatory and
abusive." 58  Without a doubt, some emotional and abusive language
may be of only modest policy import. However, we can also ask why
derogatory and abusive or other emotional language is being used in
addressing an official. Where one observer may see merely personal
abuse, a more astute observer may rightly see an unfolding recognition
by the speaker of oppressive mistreatment by others. By analogy,
Abusive language by a wife directed at a husband may bespeak a vague
frustration on the part of the wife with her broader circumstances.5 9 Of
course, sometimes, it is not easy to separate apparently personal abuse
from the expression of half-conscious, group-based grievances and
frustration, often with a genuinely political dimension. 60
56. See, for example, State v. Hammersley, 10 P.3d 1285 (Idaho 2000), the all-civilian, single
epithet case where the speaker and verbal target were in separate cars and thus not particularly
likely to fight. The court's conclusion in Hammersley was that
Hammersley's statement to Goodwin neither contained nor expressed any message of
social or political importance. The comment was not made generally, but was directed
toward a specific individual with the sole purpose of being derogatory and abusive.
Such personal abuse cannot be reasonably interpreted as the communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution.
Id. at 1289; see also Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d 54 (Pa. 1980) (upholding a
disorderly conduct conviction where the defendant followed a meter maid down the street with a
stream of abusive language).
57. For background, see A. Leon Higginbottham, Jr., Rosa Parks: Foremother and Heroine
Teaching Civility and Offering a Vision For a Better Tomorrow, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 899
(1995).
58. Hammersley, 10 P.3d at 1289.
59. See, e.g., HENRIK IBSEN, A Doll's House, in A DOLL'S HOUSE. THE WILD DUCK. THE
LADY FROM THE SEA. (R. Farquharson Sharp & Eleanor Marx-Aveling trans., Dent 1958) (1879).
For commentary, see Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnick, Convergences: Law, Literature, and
Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913 (1990).
60. A broader discussion is presented in Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
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None of this should suggest that the courts do not often accord a wide
constitutional scope for strongly emotional speech, however. Courts
often protect emotional invective even where, from the available record,
it does not appear either that a social issue is really in play, or that any
reasonable balancing of interests would favor the speaker.6 1 Consider,
for example, the New York Court of Appeals case of People v. Dietze.62
The court specified what it took to be the few relevant facts as follows:
Complainant and her son, both mentally retarded, were walking down
a public street in the Town of Norfolk. Defendant came to her
doorway with a friend and, while facing the street, referred to
complainant as a "bitch" and to her son as a "dog," and said that she
would "beat the crap out of [the complainant] some day or night on
the street." With that, complainant fled in tears and reported
the incident to authorities. Defendant had been aware of the
complainant's mental limitations and had, on a prior occasion, been
warned by a police officer about arguing with her again. 63
Apparently, there were previous hostile interactions between the
complainant and the defendant. 64 Based on the opinion, it is impossible
to guess the real nature of the defendant's emotionally expressed
grievance against a mentally retarded mother and son. The defendant's
emotional threats might reflect something like the mere negative
attitudes toward or fear of mentally retarded persons recognized bx the
Supreme Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc. 5 Of
course, shared irrational fears may sadly translate themselves into more
apparently objective phenomena, such as reduced property values. 66
However, in Dietze, there is no indication that any significant number of
mentally retarded persons was involved, and property values based
largely on emotions do not lose their emotional character. Emotion is,
in any event, central to the case.
61. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. State, 38 S.W.3d 350 (Ark. 2001) (dismissing a case on First
Amendment and due process grounds where a thirteen-year-old female student was charged under
a misdemeanor public school teacher abuse or insult statute for publicly addressing a female
teacher as "bitch" after frustration at multiple rejections by the teacher of the student's classroom
science project assignment); Commonwealth v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943 (Pa. 1999) (disorderly
conduct charge dismissed against speaker who claimed she had been subjected to frequent police
harassment, where speaker uttered a single profane, insulting remark directed in a normal tone of
voice at a police officer while walking away from the officer).
62. People v. Dietze, 549 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1989).
63. Id. at 1167 (citation omitted).
64. See id.
65. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985) (holding that
the court of appeals erred in concluding that a mental retardation classification was quasi-suspect
and required heightened scrutiny).
66. See id. at 448.
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Surprisingly, emotionally referring to a mentally retarded mother and
son as a "bitch" and a "dog" and threatening to beat up the mother at
some unspecified future time are sometimes not unprotected "fighting
words" under Chaplinsky. The mentally retarded woman's reaction was
one of fear, rather than a desire to immediately, physically harm her
verbal assailant.67 Thus, there may have been no realistic likelihood of
any immediate combative response by the verbal victim.68  More
realistically, one might argue that the defendant's emotional epithets
constituted "fighting words" under Chaplinsky in a less literal sense.
Chaplinsky, after all, permits a state to prohibit words "which by their
very utterance inflict injury,' 69 even if the victim, in this case a
mentally retarded mother with her mentally retarded son, is unlikely to
physically retaliate. The victim's fear in this case seems both real and
predictable.
Whatever the origins of the defendant's emotional insults and threat
of violence, its social value seems obscure. That the threat of violence
was not scheduled for execution at any specified time may prevent the
threat from amounting to a legal assault,7 1 but the very open-endedness
of the threat added to the emotional burden on the victim. A looming,
open-ended, subjectively credible threat may inflict as much, if not
more, "injury' 72 over time than a threat of immediate harm.
Perhaps, underlying the lack of realism in Dietze is the distortion
caused by mechanically applying the standard First Amendment
templates to the case. The defendant and the reviewing court were both
aware of the victim-complainant's mental limitations. 73 Yet the court
interestingly, if offhandedly, reported that the defendant had previously
"been warned by a police officer about arguing with" the complainant. 74
We should not read too much into the characterization of the verbal
relation between the defendant and the complainant as an "argument,"
67. See Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1167.
68. Cf Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (noting that unprotected
"fighting words" are "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace").
69. Id.
70. See Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1167.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Fallen, 256 F.3d 1082, 1087 (11 th Cir. 2001) (citing United
States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 497, 500 (5th Cir. 1980)) (stating that forcible assault requires a fear or
expectation of "immediate bodily harm"); State v. Smiley, 38 S.W.3d 521, 523 (Tenn. 2001)
(quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-101 (1997)) (stating that assault required causing another to
reasonably fear "imminent bodily injury").
72. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
73. See Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1167.
74. Id.
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however. The very concept of an argument steers our understanding in
the direction of a forensic duel, with verbal thrusts and ripostes, focused
on the exchange of more or less persuasive ideas. This model distorts
the facts underlying the Dietze case.
We, again, do not know much about the underlying motivational facts
in Dietze. The extent to which anything like the exchange, or even the
one-sided expression, of social ideas involved is largely unclear. What
seems more clear is that the Dietze case was largely about emotional
expression by the defendant and the emotional injury or other emotional
reaction of the complainant and her son. 75 The court in Dietze focused,
instead, on the undoubted constitutional value of emotional, even
insulting or abusive, language in some contexts, 76 the alleged lack of
seriousness of the defendant's threat,77  and the presumed
unreasonableness of the mentally retarded complainant in taking the
defendant's threat seriously, 78  despite the defendant's earlier
animosity. 79
To the extent that the court in Dietze came to terms with the role of
emotion in speech, it did so with insensitivity to the nature, roles, and
variability of emotions, emotional expression, and emotional reactions.
The speech-protective case of Dietze is a mirror image of the speech-
restrictive case of Suiter discussed above. 80  Neither the emotional
speech-restrictive nor the emotional speech-protective cases 81 seem to
rely upon, let alone expressly articulate, any sensitive understanding of
the role, values, and appropriate limits of largely emotional speech.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 1168.
77. Id. at 1169-70.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 1167.
80. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text (noting that emotionally charged speech,
which fails to communicate either ideas or information, is not entitled to First Amendment
protection).
81. In a later case, a New York court recounted the Dietze case in untroubled fashion. See
People v. Yablov, 706 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593-94 (2000). The court concluded its summary of the
Dietze case by reporting that the New York Court of Appeals had found that "although clearly'abusive' and 'coarse,' 'insulting' and 'harsh,' defendant's language constituted protected
expression under the time honored principles underlying free speech as guaranteed by the First
Amendment." Id. at 594.
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B. Commercial Nude Dancing and the Expression and Conveyance of
Sexual Emotions
As in the above discussion of emotional expression in disorderly
conduct cases,82 the goal of briefly discussing some of the commercial
nude dancing cases is not to decide whether any given case was rightly
decided. Rather, a discussion of commercial nude dancing cases serves
to illustrate the need for a better theory of the nature and role of emotion
and emotional communication as it relates to both speaker and listener.
Nude dancing, even in a commercial context, is commonly thought to
involve the expression and the stimulation of erotic emotions or ideas. 83
Eroticism seems to involve both emotion and idea, if we assume that
idea and emotion can be kept distinct. Courts generally provide no clear
understanding of any relationship or distinction between emotion and
idea in this context.84  The courts have generally taken no position on
any identity, overlap, or distinction between the expression of erotic
emotions or of erotic ideas through dance. One typical court cited a
general encyclopedia for the idea that "'[d]ancing consists in the
rhythmical movement of any or all parts of the body in accordance with
some scheme of individual or concerted action which is expressive of
emotions or ideas."' 85
Moreover, the element of eroticism in nude dancing does not help
distinguish whether it is ideas or emotions that are being expressed or
82. See supra Part IL.A (discussing oral speech and accusations of disorderly conduct)..
83. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 587 (1991) (White, J., dissenting)
(noting that dancing in general "inherently embodies the expression and communication of ideas
and emotions"), rev'g Miller v. City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
banc); Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 2000) (erotic dancing seen as
not involving high artistic value, but as expressing "ideas and emotions" different from those of
other sorts of dances); DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403, 409 (6th Cir. 1997)
(Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Barnes, 501 U.S. at 581) ("[Diancing as a performance directed
to an actual or hypothetical audience gives expression at least to generalized emotion or feeling,
and where the dancer is nude or nearly so the feeling expressed, in the absence of some contrary
clue, is eroticism, carrying an endorsement of erotic experience."); Morris v. Municipal Court,
652 P.2d 51, 57 n. II (Cal. 1982) (quoting In re Giannini, 446 P.2d 535, 538-39 (Cal. 1968))
("[T]he very definition of dance describes it as an expression of emotion or ideas .... The dance
is perhaps the earliest and most spontaneous mode of expressing emotion and dramatic feeling.");
Purple Orchid Inc. v. Pa. State Police, 721 A.2d 84, 89 (Pa. Cormnw. Ct. 1998) ("[N]ude dancing
performances may generate emotions and feelings of eroticism and sensuality among the
spectators .... "); see also Clinton P. Hansen, Note, To Strip or Not to Strip: The Demise of Nude
Dancing and Erotic Expression Through Cumulative Regulation, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 561, 582
n.145 (2001).
84. See supra note 83 (noting that artistic expression communicates, even if it is erotic in
nature).
85. In re Giannini, 446 P.2d at 538-39 (quoting 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 13-14
(1945)), quoted in Morris, 652 P.2d at 57 n. 11.
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stimulated. We can imagine both an erotic idea and, if we assume that
emotions do not already involve ideas, an erotic emotion or "passion."
The element of eroticism, sensuality, or sexual expression may actually
serve as one way to ensure that the dance in question falls, at least,
within the outer perimeters of the free speech clause.
Ordinary social or recreational dancing, interestingly, has been held
not to fall within the scope of the First Amendment. In City of Dallas v.
Stanglin,86 the Court worried about the possible expressiveness of
virtually any sort of deliberate activity.8 7 The Court concluded that
teenage commercial dance hall patrons engaging in social dancing did
not thereby engage in either "expressive association" or expression
itself for First Amendment purposes. 88 The Court held that "the activity
of these dance-hall patrons-coming together to engage in recreational
dancing-is not protected by the First Amendment." 89
The case law, however, does not illuminate the crucial differences
between social dancing and commercial nude dancing. Presumably, the
Court would not want to say that social dancing is typically not
expressive of anything, in any sense.90 Should we say then that nude
dancing conveys a recognizable emotion-based idea, but that social
dancing typically does not? Does commercial nude dancing express or
stimulate an emotion, where social dancing does not? Does social
dancing really convey neither an emotion nor an emotion-based idea?
Would it not be more plausible to say that social dancing merely
conveys ideas or emotions-again, assuming ideas and emotions can be
separated-that differ from those conveyed by nude dancing?
Could social dancing, for example, not intentionally convey
emotional ideas of teenage rebelliousness, sensuality, disinhibition, or,
as with some modem social dances, something like alienation? These
are obvious possibilities. It is difficult to believe that nude dancing
conveys some sort of emotion-based idea but that social dancing does
not. If we are to really justify or rebut the decision to constitutionally
protect the former, but not the latter, we will need a better
understanding of emotion in the communicative process, on the part of
either the "speaker" or the "audience."
86. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
87. Id. at 25.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. (stating that "it is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every
activity a person undertakes").
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Would it suffice to say that nude dancing generally conveys its
emotions or emotional ideas more clearly or more unmistakably than
does typical social dancing? There may be a certain logic to this
distinction. But, we do not generally penalize lack of clarity or
articulateness in speech by leaving such speech entirely unprotected
under the free speech clause. 91  We, thus, need a better theory of
emotion and its conveyance and induction if we are to explain why
various forms of dancing should or should not be constitutionally
protected.92
Similarly, we need a better theory of emotion to satisfactorily account
for why semi-nude dancing is a constitutionally permissible substitute
for a prohibition on nude dancing. It is possible to argue that imposing
a limit of semi-nudity is only a de minimus restriction on expression. 93
One can, in some sense, do the same dance and convey essentially the
same message, clad or nude.94  As the Supreme Court has observed,
"the requirement that the dancers don pasties and g-strings does not
deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply
makes the message slightly less graphic." 95
This distinction may sound plausible, but the belief that a dancer can
convey essentially the same emotion, or the same emotional message,
whether nude or clad, at whatever distance, actually exposes an
unresolved conflict among Supreme Court opinions. Would the Court
be willing to say that requiring Cohen's jacket to read something like "I
strongly object to the Draft," "Down with the Draft," or "Darn the
Draft" would leave Cohen's message essentially intact? Would it be
essentially the same message, perhaps less intensely conveyed?
91. By itself, for example, burning an American flag may not begin to convey any relatively
precise message one wishes to communicate. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 431
(1989) (noting Johnson's attendant verbal messages, which included, for example, "Reagan,
Mondale which will it be? Either one means World War III" and "red, white, and blue, we spit
on you, you stand for plunder, you will go under."). The act of burning the flag surely cannot be
taken to well articulate all and only Johnson's accompanying oral messages.
92. We assume that classic ballets, such as Tchaikovsky's Swan Lake, can be protected on a
variety of grounds. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981)
(extending First Amendment protection for pure entertainment); Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v.
Bason, 147 F. Supp. 2d 383, 393 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (referring to the "award winning
choreography" of a particular nude ballet).
93. E.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 294 (2000); Schultz v. City of Cumberland,
228 F.3d 831, 847 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571 (1991)).
94. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 294; Schultz, 228 F.3d at 847.
95. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571; see Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 937 P.2d 154, 170-71
(Wash. 1997) (en banc) (distance requirement between nude dancers and patrons interpreted as
affecting place of conveying erotic message, but not affecting the erotic message itself). But see
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 587, 592 (White, J., dissenting) (analyzing nudity as having different
expressive and emotional impact than partial nudity).
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The underlying unresolved tension is illustrated by the opposing
strands in Cohen and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.96  Cohen
emphasized that even slight changes in wording may change the
emotive, if not the cognitive, message conveyed, and that there might be
no fully adequate substitute available, in some contexts, for particular
words. 97 Pacifica Foundation, however, concluded that in an indecent
radio broadcast case, requiring more decorous language tended chiefly
to affect the form, as opposed to the content of the message, and that
few indecently expressed thoughts were not expressible in more
decorous language.98
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,99 a case more akin to Cohen than to
Pacifica Foundation, and in other cases,100 the Seventh Circuit
concluded that:
[R]estricting the particular movements and gestures of the erotic
dancer, in addition to prohibiting full nudity.., unconstitutionally
burdens protected expression. The dominant theme of nude dance is
an "emotional one, it is one of eroticism and sensuality." . . . [The
restriction] deprives the performer of a repertoire of expressive
elements with which to craft an erotic, sensual performance and
thereby interferes substantially with the dancer's ability to
communicate her erotic message.101
Clearly, the differential emotional effects of nudity and near nudity
must be better understood if the courts are to reach a consistent
understanding of the scope and logic of free speech protection in this
area. A useful model of emotional communication is, in this and other
respects, desirable.
C. The Expression of Emotion in Commercial Advertising
The courts have made clear that the for-profit or commercial nature
of a speaker and its speech does not necessarily deprive the speech of its
96. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18 (1978).
97. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
98. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 743 n.18.
99. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571 (1991).
100. Cf., e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 318-19 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing disputability of the difference in the emotional message conveyed by
nude as opposed to semi-nude dancing).
101. Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 847 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The
court in Schultz concluded by emphasizing that the legal restriction at issue "interdicts the two
key tools of expression in this context that imbue erotic dance with its sexual and erotic
character-sexually explicit dance movements and nudity." ld.; see also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 592
(White, J., dissenting).
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constitutionally protected status. 10 2  In this basic sense, expressing
emotion for profit remains within the scope of the free speech clause.
Commercially expressed, commercially motivated emotion can in some
cases be genuine. 10 3 The New York Times could, for example, express
corporate as well as collective and personal pride in commercially
advertising its winning of a Pulitzer Prize. Self-service, even of a
commercial sort, is not incompatible with genuinely expressed emotion.
Nevertheless, commercial speech generally should be assumed to
have largely commercial motivations. 104 Of course, professed corporate
emotion may not invariably be sincere; that is, what looks like corporate
emotion may not be. Consider, for example, the complications of Bad
Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority.105 This case
involved the Liquor Authority's disapproval of an artistically rendered
label used in the marketing of Bad Frog Beer. In particular, the label
depicted a four-fingered cartoon frog presenting what is familiarly
known as an obscene gesture. 106 Bad Frog Brewery did not deny the
depiction of the gesture, or the common interpretation of the gesture as
insulting, offensive, and expressing a correspondingly negative
emotional state of mind on the part of the gesturer. 10 7  Bad Frog
Brewery also presented its cartoon frog along with several advertising
slogans, including "'He just don't care,' 'An amphibian with an
attitude,' 'Turning bad into good,' and 'The beer so good.., it's
bad."' 108
All in all, one might suspect that Bad Frog Brewery's use of the
rudely gesturing amphibian was merely an attempt to cultivate a
102. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (finding a limitation
on display of alcoholic beverages invalid); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995)
(upholding a limitation on early mailings by attorneys to accident victims as prospective clients);
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (prohibition on displaying alcohol content on
beer labels); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) ("That the Times was
paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that
newspapers and books are sold."). For general criticism, see C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a
Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2097 (1992).
103. For example, commercially expressed or motivated statements can be genuine in the
sense that the corporation's principal owners and employees happen to concur in their emotional
sentiments regarding the survival or success of the business, a corporate award or prize, a
government contract, or a civic achievement.
104. For discussion of commercial speech in terms of the proposal of a commercial
transaction, see Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
105. Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1998).
106. Id. at 91.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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vaguely disreputable, minimally rebellious, undomesticated, perhaps
pointlessly defiant image in the mind of its target market. Mildly
controversial advertising can be a sensible marketing strategy, 10 9 with
or without emotion. This approach was not, however, the strategy
officially endorsed by Bad Frog Brewery for purposes of litigation. Bad
Frog Brewery argued, with whatever credibility, that "the frog's
gesture, whatever its past meaning in other contexts, now means 'I want
a Bad Frog beer,' and that the company's goal was to claim the gesture
as its own and as a symbol of peace, solidarity, and good will."1 10 If
Bad Frog Brewery was genuinely seeking a reversal of the ordinary
import of the frog's gesture, this sentiment might have been
accompanied by some sort of corporate emotion, distinct from whatever
emotion Bad Frog Brewery intended to produce in the reader. Thus, the
complexities of corporate emotional expression are multifaceted.
To these possibilities of expressed emotions, successfully or
unsuccessfully conveyed or provoked, we must add the possibility of
commercial pseudo-emotion. By this approach, Bad Frog Brewery
itself does not in any sense feel or intend to convey any real emotion,
whether of contempt and defiance or of "peace, solidarity, and good
will."II' Pseudo-emotion can be just another marketing strategy. The
commercial speaker can argue, however, that even the appearance of
emotion can lift the relevant speech from the category of mere
commercial speech into the more strongly protected category of non-
commercial speech.' 12
Rather than further multiply the possibilities of classifying real and
false commercial emotion, let us simply say that we need a theory of
emotion and emotional expression that will allow us to do justice to the
obscurities of commercial or corporate emotional expression.
109. R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING WORDS: FREE SPEECH IN A COMMERCIAL CULTURE 135-
56 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
110. Bad Frog Brewery, 134 F.3d at 91 (quoting promotional material included in Bad Frog
Brewery's application to New York State Liquor Authority seeking brand label approval and
registration).
11. Id. For expressed doubt about the capacity of corporations themselves to genuinely have
emotions, at least in a strict sense, see Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability: From Adaptation and Limitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity,
4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 641, 692 (2000).
112. See Bad Frog Brewery, 134 F.3d at 94. The court ultimately classified the beer label as
commercial speech, as opposed to some sort of satiric political or social commentary evoking full
free speech protection. Id. at 97.
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D. Emotion, Speech, and Workplace Sexual Harassment
Workplace sexual harassment comes in a wide range of forms. 113
Commonly, speech constitutes at least part of the harassment,11 4 and
almost as commonly, there is an important emotional component to the
speech. Emotion may pervade the speaker's words and the harassed
party's reactions to the speaker's words. 115  The idea of an "abusive"
working environment is often linked to emotional expression, or
certainly to emotions in reaction to expression. 116  However, the
Supreme Court has not yet issued an explicit holding on the extent to
which freedom of speech places any limits on the scope of federal civil
rights law 117 in the context of sexual harassment, 1 8 yet the potential for
conflict is clear. Title VII is violated when speech in the form of
"discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult" 119  becomes"sufficiently severe or pervasive"' 120 as to adversely affect the terms and
conditions of the victim's employment.121
113. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1998) (clarifying the
distinction between quid-pro-quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment sexual
harassment).
114. A majority of the cases involve hostile environment claims, perhaps in combination with
quid-pro-quo sexual harassment claims, at least according to one substantial sample. Ann Juliano
& Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 593
(2001). Although it is possible to construct a hostile environment entirely without the use of
written or oral language or other communicative symbols, such communicative elements will
commonly be present. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993) (spoken
words central to the case); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace
and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 691 (1997) ("Although
most litigated sexual harassment cases involve repeated sexual propositions or physical
conduct .... some sexual harassment cases rest largely on the display of pornography, the use of
sexually offensive epithets, statements of hostility toward women in the occupation or the
workplace, or other verbal or graphic expression."). See generally Baty v. Willamette Indus.,
Inc., 172 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (describing sexual harassment incidents).
115. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 114, at 689-91 (referring to typically emotion-laden
statements and messages, sent and received, including "intimidation, ridicule, and insult," "taunts,
ridicule, or threats," "offensive epithets," "statements of hostility," insults, and innuendos); Bat,,
172 F.3d at 1237-40.
116. See, e.g., Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71 (2001) (quoting
Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 67 (1986)).
117. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2001) (the basic
text bearing upon sexual discrimination in many workplaces); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, 477
U.S. at 64.
118. David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV.
83, 114 (2001) ("The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of punishing
workplace speech ...."). But see Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993) (First
Amendment not violated by penalty enhancement for gender-motivated crimes); Hishon v. King
& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (First Amendment not violated by Title VII).
119. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65).
120. Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67).
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We should, therefore, seek an understanding of the best way to
resolve real or apparent conflicts between freedom of speech and basic
workplace civil rights. To do this, we must better appreciate the roles of
emotion and emotional speech in typical workplace sexual harassment
cases. In such cases, most of the directly relevant speech is that of the
harasser, as is some of the emotion, but much of the relevant emotion is
that of the victim. Consider, for example, the mixture of speech and
non-speech, as well as of the emotions of all parties involved in the
important case of Harris v. Forklift Systems. 122  The trier of fact in
Harris found that:
[T]hroughout Harris' time at Forklift, Hardy [Forklift's president]
often insulted her because of her gender and often made her the target
of unwanted sexual innuendos. Hardy told Harris on several
occasions, in the presence of other employees, "You're a woman,
what do you know" and "We need a man as the rental manager"; at
least once, he told her that she was a "dumb ass woman." Again in
front of others, he suggested that the two of them "go to the Holiday
Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise." Hardy occasionally asked Harris and
other female employees to get coins from his front pants pocket. He
threw objects on the ground in front of other women, and asked them
to pick the objects up. He made sexual innuendos about Harris' and
other women's clothing.' 2 3
This and similar scenarios involve a mixture of language and other
behavior. All of the behavior can be said, in some sense, to be
expressive, and indeed communicative.
There are, of course, important differences between the verbal and
non-verbal conduct in sexual harassment cases and among different
forms of verbal expression. These differences should not be minimized.
All verbal and non-verbal harassing conduct in any given case can be
placed at one point or another on a very broad continuum, with sexual
battery on one extreme and the least threatening sort of abstract
discussion on the other. The fact that the various kinds of speech and
121. Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67). This form of "hostile environment"
sexual harassment is not the only manner in which Title VII can be violated on the basis of sexual
harassment. Speech in the form of quid pro quo sexual harassment, resulting perhaps in some
tangible job action against the victim, may also violate Title VII. The underlying facts in
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747-48, 750 (1998) (noting a reported statement
of "are you wearing shorter skirts yet, Kim, because it would make your job a whole heck of a lot
easier"), could be read as, in part, amounting to a speech-based quid pro quo sexual harassment
claim.
122. Harris, 510U.S. at 19.
123. Id. (citations to the record omitted). For comparison with other patterns of speech,
conduct, and emotion, see, for example, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782
(1998); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748-49.
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other forms of conduct in all of these cases can be ranged on such a
continuum does not mean that all the speech and all the conduct must be
treated alike for free speech purposes. It will be useful to notice not
only the recurring element of emotional expression in sexual harassment
but also the differences in how emotions are expressed to the victim, the
victim's reactive emotions, how those reactive emotions are expressed
or conveyed, and even the harasser's emotions in experiencing the
victim's emotional reactions.
Much sexual harassment consists largely of emotional expression,
either verbal or non-verbal. The emotional expression may, by itself, be
sufficiently gratifying to motivate the harassment. However, in other
cases, part of the motivation consists of imagining or observing the
emotional reactions of the victim, with the opportunity to then
emotionally react to those emotions. 124 Additionally, there is no reason
to suppose that verbal sexual harassment will typically be less
emotional than non-verbal forms. Surely, it is difficult to convey
cognitively subtle messages by tossing coins on the floor,125 or even by
the mixture of verbal and non-verbal elements in the demand to remove
coins from one's pocket. 126  Thus, much verbal sexual harassment
offers little cognitive subtlety beyond the sexual emotions expressed. 127
The judicial opinions addressing issues of free speech in the context
of sexual harassment are not always convincingly reasoned. One public
employment case, 12 8 for example, involved a claim that a county fire
department's sexual harassment policy violated employee free speech
rights129 as applied, in particular, to an employee's private perusal and
consensual sharing of a Playboy magazine. 130 The court determined
that Playboy "contains articles relating to politics, sports, art, and
entertainment."' 131  These subjects were deemed of general public
124. There may be differences in the communicative dynamics of, for example, harassing
graffiti about women on the wall of a men's restroom, or in a more public area of the workplace,
or any sort of sexual harassment directed at an immediately present, identified victim.
125. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
126. Seeid.
127. See, e.g., id.
128. Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
129. For the basic judicial tests involving public employee workplace speech, see Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1987) (addressing whether an employee's speech was a
matter of public concern); Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (briefly addressing the
question of whether an employee's speech was on a matter of public concern); and Pickering v.
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568-74 (1968) (balancing of government interests, as
employer and service provider, with employee or citizen speech rights).
130. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1435-37.
131. Id. at 1436.
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interest, as opposed to the merely self-oriented or parochial job interests
of a particular employee. 132 As a result, the court was "compelled to
find that plaintiff's reading of Playboy amount[ed] to expression
relating to matters of public concern."' 133
We may assume that in reading the magazine, the employee, and not
merely the author and publisher, was expressing himself on some public
issue. The relationship, if any, between the public issue and firefighting
we may leave unexplored. We may also assume that the magazine was
read only during contractually permissible hours. However, the court
left one crucial matter unclear: what were the possible effects on other
workers of the private reading, as against whatever benefits accrue to
the reader, to the general public, or to any consumers of firefighting
services? Also, how would the analysis differ if the articles alone were
made available, with the presumably more emotionally evocative
materials, including all pictorials, excised? Do the pictorials themselves
also count as addressing matters of public concern? Does the consumer
of firefighting services, or the general public, benefit from perusals by
firefighters of the pictorials?
Further complications arise in a widely cited case regulating
employee speech for the sake of reducing workplace sexual harassment.
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,134 the court ultimately
rejected a free speech defense. 135 The court did so on the basis of a
number of considerations. First, even though in some cases the
harassing speech is that of the employer's principal corporate figure, 136
often the corporate employer does not attempt to speak through the
employees or other persons who engaged in the actual harassing
speech.137 The corporate-employer defendant did not attempt to speak
in Robinson.138  Why should there be a free speech defense for a
defendant who does not directly or indirectly engage in the relevant
speech?
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding
that posting sexually suggestive posters of women in the workplace and making demeaning
remarks about women created a hostile working environment for female employees).
135. Id. at 1534-37.
136. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993) (discussing how the
conduct of the company's president led to a sexual harassment lawsuit).
137. See Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1534.
138. See id. at 1531.
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Second, the court in Robinson characterized the employee's language
as both discriminatory speech and discriminatory conduct. 139 There is a
sense that all public speech is also conduct, but discriminatory acts may
seem generally less protection-worthy than discriminatory speech, 140
even though the boundaries of speech and conduct are often murky. 14
1
Thus, this consideration also works against a free speech defense.
Third, the Robinson court considered the possibility of classifying
restrictions on harassing workplace speech as mere time, place, and
manner restrictions. 14 2  Such restrictions literally regulate the time,
place, and manner of speaking, and do not restrict speech, typically, in
the privacy of one's home. The problem is that in order to qualify for a
reduced level of judicial scrutiny, the restriction on the time, place, or
manner of speech must also be content-neutral, 143 and, therefore, only
incidentally restrict speech of one type of content more than that of
another. 144
Whether restricting workplace speech for the sake of workplace
equality, productivity, efficiency, or non-discrimination as content-
neutral is itself controversial. Preventing upset or distress in the target,
or victim, of unfavorable commentary is not, by itself, typically thought
139. See id. at 1523-24.
140. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (a physical assault is not
protected expressive conduct); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("Cohen's absurd and immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and little
speech."); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 505, 515 (1969) (White, J., concurring)
("[T]he Court continues to recognize a distinction between communicating by words and
communicating by acts or conduct .... ); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)
(stating, while discussing merely incidental, unintended, or content-neutral restrictions on speech,
that the Court "cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea").
141. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 431 (1989) (discussing the deeply contested
status of flag burning as political protest); supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text (referring to
the social versus commercial nude dancing distinction).
142. See Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535.
143. For competing Supreme Court approaches to content-neutrality, compare City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (justification of time, place, and manner regulation by
secondary effects test), with City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993)
(applying a more direct, literal, or common-sense test of whether speech is being regulated based
on its content). For some complications, see Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and the First
Amendment: Content-Neutral Regulation, Disparate Impact, and the "Reasonable Person, " 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (1997) (arguing that undirected, as opposed to targeted, hostile environment
speech can only be restricted in a content-based, as opposed to content-neutral, manner); Geoffrey
R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987).
144. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (requiring that any incidental restriction on free expression
be no greater than that which is necessary to further a substantial governmental interest).
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of as a content-neutral aim. 145 However, there is no reason to limit the
aims of regulating workplace speech in this way. One can certainly
defend the aims of workplace equality, productivity, efficiency, and
non-discrimination partly on grounds independent of the victim's
adverse reaction to harassing speech. Sexual harassment may, for
example, signal to a female employee that her chances of eventual
promotion are limited. Of course, preventing the sending of this signal
about future employment need not be based entirely on whether any
victim of harassment understands this signal, agrees or disagrees with
the message, or reacts emotionally to it one way or another. In addition,
sexual harassment typically does more than send signals or express
emotions, values, or other messages. Whether it is so intended or not,
sexual harassment often by itself closes doors or reinforces inequalities.
If the government regulates speech in order to prevent doors from being
closed, or to prevent the reinforcement of inequalities, its motivation in
doing so may, at least in part, be content-neutral.
Alternatively, harassing speech can operate to change, or prevent
change, at a workplace to some degree apart from whether any hearer
believes, or is persuaded by, any message expressed by harassing
speech. 14 6 Of course, some restrictions on workplace harassment may
well be content-based. In such cases, the restriction on speech can be
constitutional only if the government can show that the restriction is
narrowly tailored or necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest. 147 Thus, we need to incorporate a role for emotion, emotional
expression, and emotional reactions in determining whether, for
example, equality of opportunity or nondiscrimination could count as
compelling interests. 148
145. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) ("Listeners' reactions to speech are not the
kind of 'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton."), Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240
F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[Glovemment may not prohibit speech under a 'secondary effects'
rationale based solely on the emotive impact that its offensive content may have on a
listener .... ).
146. Suppose the verbal sexual harassment consists of repeated unwelcome references to a
victim's physical characteristics. Must the regulating government, logically, deny the truth of any
express or implied assertion by the harasser? Must the government dislike or fear the
consequences of anyone's being persuaded by or reinforced in their belief of the truth of any
express or implied assertion in such a case? Verbal sexual harassment in the form of references
to sex with the victim could be analyzed in a similar way. The classic logic of a content-based
speech restriction simply need not be present in these and other kinds of workplace sexual
harassment cases.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Sable
Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
148. For an argument that much of the regulation of workplace harassment can survive strict
scrutiny, see Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equalir' in the Workplace?
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Taking a rather different approach, the court in Robinson addressed
sexually harassing speech in the context of the "captive audience" case
law. 14 9 Under this theory, employees who have no realistic alternative
to listening are held captive to the extent their preference not to listen is
overridden, and the "audience" for harassing speech thus artificially and
involuntarily expands. 150  The captive audience doctrine arose in non-
workplace contexts, including automobiles, 151 personal residences, 152
and public buses. 153 How genuinely "captive" to any given speech one
really is in any of these circumstances is disputable; 154 captivity may be
a matter of degree. Arguably, many women are less realistically free to
leave an offending workplace than the "captives" in the above
circumstances may be able to avoid the offending speech. If a worker
wishes to quit, the loss of wages and benefits may be important. If
another job is sought, the applicant may seem unreliable for having quit
her previous job. Telling her story may alienate potential employers.
There may be little reason to suppose that the next job would involve
less sexual harassment. A new job opportunity that realistically
promises no harassment may be widely desired for just that reason, and,
therefore, more difficult to obtain in a competitive market. These
circumstances, to one degree or another, characterize the position of
workplace harassment victims.
Free speech law typically accommodates the speaker's interest in
seeking out, from among the general public, a sympathetic audience. 155
Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 435-46
(1996).
149. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535-36 (M.D. Fla.
1991). For a brief discussion of these and other tacks taken in Robinson, see Baty v. Willamette
Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 1999).
150. For a discussion, see, for example, J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2310-13 (1999); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the
Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 715-17 (1997).
The captive audience doctrine in the context of workplace harassment is briefly referred to in Avis
Rent A Car System v. Aguilar, 529 U.S. 1138, 1138 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (citing Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999)).
151. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (analyzing car radio
broadcasts).
152. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988) (repeated instances of audible
"focused" picketing of private residence).
153. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (political
message-bearing signs in public buses).
154. A car radio can be instantly turned off or switched to a less offending station; earplugs,
headphones, music, or television may effectively drown out the sounds of sidewalk protesters;
one can avert one's eyes from particular offending bus signs. Cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 21 (1971) (averting one's eyes seen as effectively avoiding further bombardment).
155. See id. ("[P]resence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to
justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense.").
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In addition, sexual harassment law often accommodates a legitimate,
good faith process of seeking a sympathetic audience for the speech in
question. 156 Nevertheless, whether a harasser's free speech rights can
be limited should depend not only on captive audience concerns or the
other arguments discussed in Robinson, but on more basic elements of
emotional communication. As we shall see, these include the presence
or absence of an attempt by the speaker to seek something like greater
emotional agreement or emotional congruence with the target-
listener. 157
III. EMOTIONAL SPEECH AS SUFFICIENT FOR A FREE SPEECH THEORY
A. The Nature of Emotion
Today, students of the emotions generally see emotions as more
logically structured, more logically assertive, and more vulnerable to
logical critique than before. 158 In fact, an emotion-based understanding
of free speech can, remarkably, approach the status of a full and
complete theory of free speech. At the very least, an emotion-based
understanding of free speech can shed light on each of the four problem
areas discussed above: disorderly conduct speech, 159 nude dancing or
distinctively sexual expressive conduct,160 commercial emotion,161 and
workplace sexually harassing speech. 162  Our further discussion of
emotional speech in these contexts will suggest the sufficiency of an
emotion-based approach to free speech.
156. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) ("[O]ffhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment."'); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 768 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing how sexual harassment requires
showing a hostile workplace with harassment so pervasive that it alters terms and conditions of
employment). But see Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment"
Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627, 647 (1997) (finding that isolated instances of
harassment by many persons may, in the aggregate, be severe and pervasive). For a response to
Volokh's commentary, see Deborah Epstein, Free Speech at Work: Verbal Harassment as
Gender-Based Discriminatory (Mis)treatment, 85 GEO. L.J. 649 (1997).
157. See infra Part IV.E (discussing an emotion-based approach to workplace sexual
harassment and free speech).
158. See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text (discussing cognitivism as the dominating
philosophical study of the emotions).
159. See supra Part II.A (discussing oral speech and accusations of disorderly conduct).
160. See supra Part II.B (discussing commercial nude dancing and the expression and
conveyance of sexual emotions).
161. See supra Part II.C (discussing the expression of emotion in commercial advertising).
162. See supra Part II.D (discussing emotion, speech, and workplace sexual harassment).
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Our references to "emotion" herein are intended to be broadly
inclusive. For some purposes, it is admittedly useful to distinguish
among "feelings such as joy, moods such as depression, emotions such
as love, attitudes such as admiration, virtues such as courage, and traits
of character such as bashfulness." 16 3  But, it is also often proper and
more useful, as in developing an emotion-based approach to free
speech, to think of all these phenomena as emotions. In this broad
sense, emotions, or at least some emotions in the right circumstances,
have long been seen as valuable components of psychological, ethical,
and social life. However, appreciation of the role of emotions has not
been universal. 164  But generally, passion or emotion has been
recognized as valuable in at least some instances. The Confucian
Analects, for example, enjoin one to "[s]how genuine grief at a parent's
death, keep offering sacrifices to them as time goes by, and the people's
moral character shall be reinforced." 165  The character of Socrates in
Plato's Symposium declares "that every man ought to honor love...
now and always I sing the praises of love's power and courage." 166 The
profound value of the emotion of love in particular is, of course, widelyrecognized.167 The value of emotions, more generally, has also been
historically appreciated. 168
163. ANTHONY KENNY, THE METAPHYSICS OF MIND 52 (1989); see also Annette Baier, What
Emotions Are About, 4 PHIL. PERSP. 1, 3 (1990) (distinguishing emotions, as being "about
something," from moods).
164. See, e.g., PSEUDO-MACARIUS, THE FIFTY SPIRITUAL HOMILIES AND THE GREAT
LETTER, homily 4, § 8, at 53 (George A. Maloney ed. & trans., Paulist Press 1992) (1921) ("We
have received into ourselves something that is foreign to our nature, namely, the corruption of our
passions through the disobedience of the first man, which has strongly taken over in us, as though
it were a certain part of our nature by custom and long habit."); THE UPANISHADS, MUNDAKA
UPANISHAD, part 3, ch. 2, at 81 (Juan Mascar6 ed. & trans., Penguin Books 1965) (1932) ("A
man whose mind wanders among desires, and is longing for objects of desire, goes again to life
and death according to his desires."). But see, e.g., ATHANASIUS, THE LIFE OF ANTONY AND THE
LETTER TO MARCELLINUS 32-33 (Robert C. Gregg trans., Paulist Press 1980) (1697) (portraying
Antony as indeed admiring "freedom from anger" among the desert ascetics, but as admiring as
well "the mutual love of them all"); THE BHAGAVAD-GITA, SIXTEENTH TEACHING 135, lines 20-
21 (Barbara Stoler Miller trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1986) (1847) ("The three gates of hell that
destroy the self are desire, anger, and greed; one must relinquish all three."); Id. at 133, lines 1-2
(listing "compassion for creatures" as among the "divine traits"); see also MAHATMA GHANDI,
NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE 161 (Bharatan Kumarappa ed., Navajivan 1961) (1951) ("I accept
the interpretation of ahimsa, namely that it is not merely a negative state of harmlessness, but it is
a positive state of love.").
165. THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 1.9, at 49 (Chichung Huang trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1997) (1900) (attributed to the Master Zeng).
166. Plato, Symposium: The Banquet, in GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO 106 (Eric H.
Warmington & Phillip G. Rouse eds., W.H.D. Rouse trans., 1984).
167. See, e.g., GANDHI, supra note 164, at 161; MOSES MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning
Character Traits, in ETHICAL WRITINGS OF MAIMONIDES ch. 2, at 37 (Raymond L. Weiss &
Charles E. Butterworth eds. & trans., Dover 1983) (1975) ("The way of the just men is to ... act
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There is much classical sentiment that the emotions, whatever their
value, must be controlled, 169 most often by a separate 170 capacity
known as reason. 171  The radical distinction between reason and
emotion, and the subordination of emotion to the control of reason, is
famously argued for in Plato172 and Aristotle,173 but is widely held
throughout intellectual history, from the Stoics 174 to Spinoza 175 all the
way, it is said, to the Vulcan 176 people in general. 177 However, recent
out of love and rejoice in afflictions."); TERESA OF AVILA, THE LIFE OF TERESA OF JESUS: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF TERESA OF AVILA ch. XX, at 192 (E. Allison Peers ed. & trans., Doubleday
1991) (1960) ("[T]here is produced a great fear of offending so great a God, but a fear
overpowered by the deepest love, newly enkindled.").
168. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 74 (1998)
(For St. Thomas Aquinas, "emotions are inherently good, natural, and desirable.").
169. See, e.g., ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON THE VIRTUES Quaestio LIX, reply to
obj. 1, at 96 (John A. Oesterle trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1984) (1966) ("Virtue
overcomes inordinate passions; but it produces orderly passions.").
170. St. Augustine seems unwilling to separate emotion, reason, and will in any strict fashion.
See ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD book XIV, ch. 6 (Walsh ed., Doubleday Image 1958) (413)
("The consent of the will in the search for what we want is called desire, joy is the name of the
will's consent to the enjoyment of what we desire.").
171. See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO ch. XII1 (Francis MacDonald Cornford ed. & trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1988) (1941) (distinguishing and hierarchially arranging the three elements of
the soul: reason, the "spirited" element or indignation, and the various good and bad appetites).
172. See id.
173. See, e.g., RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE ON THE HUMAN GOOD 320-21 (1989)
("Aristotle says that 'the function of a human being is an activity of soul in accordance with
reason, or not without reason.' When someone has mastered his emotions in the proper way, and
made them obedient to reason, the expression of that mastery is one of the activities in which the
human good consists." (emphasis omitted)).
174. See, e.g., MARCUS AURELIUS, MEDITATIONS bk. V, No. 26, at 87 (Maxwell Staniforth
trans., Penguin Books 1964) (1634) ("Let no emotions of the flesh, be they of pain or pleasure,
affect the supreme and sovereign [reasoning] portion of the soul."); EPICTETUS, THE
ENCHIRIDION § XXVIII, at 27 (Thomas W. Higginson trans., 2d ed. 1955) ("[D]o you feel no
shame in delivering up your own mind to any reviler, to be disconcerted and confounded?").
175. 2 BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA, The Ethics, in WORKS OF SPINOZA pt. IV, at 187 (R.H.M.
Elwes trans., Dover 1955) (1883) ("Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I
name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master ....").
176. See DIANE DUANE, STAR TREK: SPOCK'S WORLD 75 (1988) (arguing that the crucial
Vulcan concept of 'Arie'mnu' should be translated as "passion's mastery," thereby
acknowledging that Vulcans do "have emotions, but are managing them [by logic or 'truth']
rather than being managed by them").
177. As an important and dramatic variant on this theme, we should recognize that the
philosopher David Hume accepted a clear and vital distinction between reason on the one hand
and emotion or the passions on the other but argued for the inevitable subordination in practice of
the former. See, e.g., J.L. MACKIE, HUME'S MORAL THEORY 2 (1980). Actually, Hume's view
of the relationship between reason and the emotions is not entirely clear. Compare DAVID HUME,
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. III, pt. 1, § 1, at 457 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Clarendon Press
1968) (1789) ("[Rleason has no influence on our passions and actions.") with DAVID HUME,
ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE OF
MORALS, ENQUIRY § 1, at 173 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. Clarendon Press 1977) (1777) ("[I]n
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intellectual history in particular has not shown a clear distinction
between the emotions, on the one hand, and reason, or related cognitive
concepts, on the other. Emotion, in and of itself, turns out to
presuppose many, if not all, of the familiar cognitive capacities. We
cannot here document this developing consensus exhaustively. But, we
can at least illustrate some of the broadly cognitive dimensions of
emotions, as currently understood.
To begin with, we should recognize that a strict distinction between
reason and emotion has not been historically adhered to consistently-
even by Plato 178 and Kant, 179 whom we might most expect to make
such a distinction. Today,, "c]ognitivism ... dominates the
philosophical study of emotions."l8 With this historical change in
approach, "[tihought replaced feeling as the principal element in the
general conception of emotion." 181
More specifically, major strains of thought today recognize emotions
as typically, if not invariably, characterized by intentionality,18 2183 184 185 186
beliefs, judgments, attitudes, modes of perception, modes of
order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its object, it is often
necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede .... ").
178. See NICKOLAS PAPPAS, PLATO AND THE REPUBLIC 84 (1995). Regarding the emotions
Plato refers to as "thumos" or "spirit," Pappas states that "these emotions entail a judgment over
and above the raw feelings of anger.... Being angry means doing some thinking." Id. For a
discussion of Plato on rhetoric, see, for example, Anthony M. Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. L.
REV. 677 (1999), and Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as Myth: Reflections on Plato's Gorgias, 74 IOWA
L. REV. 787 (1989).
179. See ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT 122 (1999) ("The unconditional
value of rational nature thus includes the capacity for feelings and emotions.").
180. John Deigh, Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions, 104 ETHICS 824, 824 (1994).
181. Id.; see also CHESHIRE CALHOUN & ROBERT C. SOLOMON, WHAT IS AN EMOTION?:
CLASSICAL READINGS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 3-40 (1984) (deeming emotions to be
partly matters of reason and rationality and partly matters of evaluation and cognition); C.D.
Broad, Emotion and Sentiment, in CRITICAL ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 283, 286 (David R.
Cheney ed., 1971) ("Every emotion is an epistemologically objective or intentional experience,
i.e., it is always a cognition either veridical or wholly or partly delusive. But every emotion is
something more than a mere cognition."); James M'Cosh, Elements Involved in Emotions, 2
MIND 413, 414 (1877) ("[A]n Idea of something, of some object or occurrence as fitted to gratify
or disappoint a Motive Principle or Appetence ... [is] an essential element in all emotion.").
182. See, e.g., Joel Marks, A Theory of Emotion, 42 PHIL. STUD. 227, 227 (1982); John
Morreall, Fear Without Belief, 90 J. PHIL. 359, 360 (1993) ("[W]hile most instances of fear in
adults involve ... mental representations and have intentional objects, there are simpler cases of
instinctive fear without intentional objects.").
183. See Marks, supra note 182, at 227 (explaining that emotions are to be "identified with
(certain sets of) beliefs and desires"); Jerome A. Shaffer, An Assessment of Emotion, 20 AM.
PHIL. Q. 161, 161 (1983) (emotions caused and differentiated by beliefs and desires); see also
Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1978 (2001) (beliefs and abilities
dependent upon emotions).
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interpreting, 187 or even modes of constructing the world. 188 Emotions
are thus not, or certainly not merely, sensations or twinges, but typically
involve beliefs, judgments, interpretations or reasonable evaluations of
world features. An emotion can thus amount to a judgment, involving
particular beliefs that some feature of the world, or some act or state of
affairs, is somehow appropriate or inappropriate. 189  Although these
cognitive dimensions of emotions have been emphasized of late, writers
as far back as Aristotle1 90 have recognized that emotion can empower
and facilitate-not merely cloud our understanding of the world. 19 1
184. See, e.g., Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotions, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 127,
127-51 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980) (discussing emotions as judgments in the sense of
"what we see the world 'in terms of' as distinct from articulated propositions"); Robert C.
Solomon, The Logic of Emotion, 11 NOOS 41, 46 (1977) ("[M]any emotions are deliberative
judgments."). For extended discussion, see RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION
(1987); JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS part IV
(1999); ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS: EMOTIONS AND THE MEANING OF LIFE (1993).
185. See RICHARD WOLLHEIM, ON THE EMOTIONS 74 (1999) ("[Plhilosophers have come to
recognize the place of an attitude or orientation within emotion."); Gabriele Taylor, Justifying the
Emotions, 84 MIND 390, 391 (1975) (referring to the "commonplace" that "the emotions involve
specific attitudes and certain ways of looking at the world," when discussing the idea that
conceptual considerations indicate a link between one's emotions and moral life); see also JOHN
HENRY NEWMAN, A GRAMMAR OF ASSENT 83 (Charles Frederick Harrold ed., Longmans, Green
1947) (1870) ("Conscience ... considered as a moral sense, an intellectual sentiment, is a sense
of admiration and disgust, of approbation and blame: but it is something more than a moral sense;
it is always emotional.").
186. See, e.g., Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson, The Moralistic Fallacy: On the
Appropriateness of Emotions, 61 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 65, 66 (2000) (discussing
emotions as involving "evaluative presentations: They purport to be perceptions of such
properties as the funny, the shameful, the fearsome, the pitiable, et al."); Nancy Sherman,
Empathy and Imagination, 22 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHIL. 82, 83 (1988) ("[W]e step out of our
egocentric, and by extension, culturally parochial world through mechanisms such as empathy.");
Ronald de Sousa, Moral Emotions (explaining that emotions as not only morally assessable, but
as revealing or disclosing value, as "modes of perception, and therefore as giving us access
to certain sorts of knowledge"), available at http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/-sousa/
moralemotions.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
187. Solomon, supra note 184, at 46 ("[E]motions are not sensations of constriction of
flushing, but constitutive interpretations of the world.").
188. See id.
189. See supra notes 182-88 (discussing various characterizations of emotions).
190. See NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF VIRTUE
45 (1989) ("Often we see not dispassionately, but because of and through the emotions.").
191. Obviously, some emotions and some expressions of emotions may not carry as much in
the way of supporting, propositional belief as others. Consider, for example, the case of someone
who expresses a fear of spiders or heights, who admittedly can offer no reasonable account of any
danger. Here, emotional expression is hardly unique. Persons can make minimally emotional
statements that clearly have no basis in reason. In general, emotion can either undermine or
enhance the effectiveness of our speech. In addition to employing emotion as a powerful
rhetorical device, we can strategically control our emotions or work ourselves into a highly
emotional state in order to seem more forceful.
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Thus, emotions and the expression of emotions contain all the basic
cognitive and non-cognitive elements essential to an analysis of
freedom of speech, and to the values underlying free speech law. 192 By
themselves, emotions and their expression actually encompass the full
scope of speech for free speech purposes. A complete and satisfactory
theory of emotions, of emotional speech, and of the values and limits of
emotional speech would, in itself, provide all the elements necessary for
a general theory of freedom of speech. That is, it is possible to build a
complete theory of free speech based on emotional speech because of
the breadth, broad cognitivity, and complexity of emotionality and
emotional speech. When we set aside the crude opposition of emotion
and reason, we begin to appreciate the broad scope of emotion and
emotional expression. Emotion, broadly understood, can encompass
cognition in general, intentions, beliefs, judgments, attitudes, modes of
perceiving and understanding, and even what we might call world-
constructions. 193 Jointly, these concepts of emotions are exactly what
we need for a theory of free speech.
Emotions, in themselves, may not be propositions in the sense of
public assertions of fact about states of affairs. 194  However, an
emotion-based approach to free speech seeks to protect not merely
emotions themselves, but the expressing, conveying, and reporting of
emotions as well. Protecting emotional expression also requires
protecting articulated emotion-based propositions. When we express,
for example, in an articulate, explicit way our contempt or admiration
for some political actor or political choice, such emotional expression
typically has some propositional content.
Emotions can, as the above political example suggests, be critiqued
as either reasonable or unreasonable. Emotion-based expression and
critiques thereof are central to freedom of speech. Whether critiques of
emotion-based expression are fair or not is open to discussion. As one
leading student of the emotions has noted, "[e]motional judgments, like
any judgments, have presuppositions and entailment relationships with a
large number of beliefs." 195  Thus, emotional judgments, whether
publicly expressed or not, rely on certain assumptions and imply certain
192. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989)
(discussing the values or purposes widely thought to underlie freedom of speech).
193. See supra notes 178-91 and accompanying text (discussing the history of distinction
between reason and emotion).
194. See supra note 184 (discussing emotions as judgments).
195. Solomon, supra note 184, at 46.
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propositions. 19 6  Emotional judgments can be critiqued in these and
other respects. These critiques are a crucial consideration we would
expect a theory of free speech to accommodate.
Nevertheless, we might wonder whether it is fair to critique anyone's
emotions, even if it is fair to critique the outward public expression of
that emotion. This concern assumes that an emotion is invariably
beyond our control, or something that just unaccountably happens to us
and for which we are not responsible. This is not so. Emotions are
often, at least partially, under our control 197-perhaps more than our
beliefs. 198 In this way, we can bear responsibility not just for how or
whether we express emotions, but also for the emotions themselves, 199
making them fair game for critique, as we would expect in the realm of
freedom of speech.
To see that emotions and emotional expression can be critiqued in the
various ways we would expect under the realm of freedom of speech, let
us consider the basic emotion of fear. A fear could be unreasonable if
based on more or less obviously false beliefs, on admittedly inadequate
grounds, on true but obviously superstitious grounds, on an
inappropriate object, as in the case of a strong fear of mussing one's
hair, or if disproportionate, as in an inordinate fear of something that
should inspire only moderate fear. 200 Of course, some fears may be
based on mistaken but quite reasonable beliefs, as in fear of a nearby
lion that has, without one's knowledge, just recently been recaptured.
The reasonableness of an emotion will often depend upon circumstance,
and perhaps upon the "[c]hildhood, adolescence, youth, maturity, [or]
196. See, e.g., Robert C. Roberts, What an Emotion Is: A Sketch, 97 PHIL. REV. 183, 201
(1988) ("[O]ne very central connection between emotions and beliefs is that they share a
propositional content.").
197. See Errol Bedford, Emotions, in ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 77, 91 (D.
Gustafson ed., 1964) (analyzing emotions as justified or unjustified, reasonable or unreasonable,
etc., based not only on matters of fact, but also on matters of judgment, assessment, or opinion);
Roberts, supra note 196, at 200; Aaron Ben Ze'ev, Emotions and Morality, 31 J. VALUE INQUIRY
195, 195 (1997) ("[W]e have some responsibility over our emotions."); cf Amelie Oksenberg
Rorty, Explaining Emotions, 75 J. PHIL. 139, 159 (1978) (referring to "the deep conservation of
emotional habits," thus indicating that changing the emotions we feel can be as difficult as
changing any deeply ingrained habit). Rorty does recognize that some emotions are based on,
and dependent upon, mistaken beliefs. See id. at 152.
198. See Roberts, supra note 196, at 200 n.26 ("Emotions are to a larger extent within our
voluntary control, and thus within the scope of our immediate responsibility, than our beliefs.").
199. See Eugene Schlossberger, Why We Are Responsible for Our Emotions, 95 MIND 37, 37
(1986) (arguing that "one is responsible for one's emotions, even if one cannot help feeling
them").
200. George Pitcher, Emotion, 74 MIND 326, 331 (1965).
462 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 34
old age"2° 1 of the party in question. All of these things comprise the
territory of free speech analysis.
Seen in this broad perspective, in which emotion cannot be separated
from the various dimensions of reason,20 2 the expression of emotion can
raise all the problems and possibilities of free speech theory in general.
When we recognize the inseparability of emotion and the various
dimensions of reason, we can more fully appreciate how "[o]ur
emotional life is deeply intertwined with our history as persons, with the
tenor of our consciousness itself., 20 3 As Martha Nussbaum has written,"emotions are suffused with intelligence and discernment, and...
contain in themselves an awareness of value or importance. '" 20 4
Speech without any emotion, if that is humanly possible, does not
raise any free speech elements, possibilities, or complications beyond
201. Baer, supra note 163, at 19.
202. For a legal discussion of the inextricability of reason from emotion, see Paul Gewirtz, On
"1 Know it When I See it," 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1029-30 (1996), and D. Don Welch, Ruling With
the Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 58-59 (1997). But see
Ilham Dilman, Reason, Passion and the Will, 59 PHIL. 185, 188 (1984) ("Hume was wrong to
divorce judgment from the emotions in his account of the passions and to represent emotions as
inevitably blind. Some emotions blind their subject to reason [but] others, though the forms of
apprehension with which they provide him, enrich his contact with his environment."). For a
contemporary study of the role of emotion in one form of judgment, see Joshua D. Greene et al.,
An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, SCIENCE, Sept. 14, 2001, at
2105, available at http://www-psych.stanford.edu/-jbt/205/greene.pdf (last visited Feb. 27,
2003). Even the idea that law or legal education improperly devalues emotion at the expense of
reason may unduly split the two. See Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Schultz, "A(nother)
Critique of Pure Reason": Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773,
1773 (1993). For a refusal to distinctly separate reason and emotion in actual communicative
practice, see Peter Brandon Mayer, Not Interaction But Melding-The "Russian Dressing"
Theory of Emotions, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2001) (reason and emotion meld to form
meaning).
203. Steven L. Ross, Evaluating the Emotions, 81 J. PHIL. 309, 315 (1984).
204. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 1
(2001). This does not suggest that emotions are beyond rational criticism, as Nussbaum
recognizes. See id. at 2. For discussion of Professor Nussbaum's work on the emotions and the
exercise of judgment, see, for example, Robert C. Roberts, Emotions As Judgments, 59 PHIL. &
PHENOM. RES. 793 (1999) (arguing that "the propositional content of some full-fledged emotions
is not assented to by the subject of the emotion" and that "the very same judgment that is
supposedly identical with an emotion can be made in the absence of the emotion"), and Richard
Sorabji, Therapy of Desire, 59 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 799 (1999). It is doubtlessly
true, as in the case of some confessedly irrational fears, that the subject does not believe the
propositional content of the emotion in question. Our point is that not all emotions are like this.
Whether we should legally protect the expression of genuine emotion the speaker admits to be
unjustified should probably be decided in a way sensitive to context. Nor is it crucial that some
propositions can be expressed with or without emotion. Not every expression is an emotion-
based expression. Removing the emotional dimension from an expression does not add a new
element to free speech analysis, as emotions themselves introduce all of the interesting cognitive
dimensions for free speech purposes, and emotions can plainly vary in strength, from extremely
intense, to subconsciously felt, to nearly zero in intensity, as in a mild sense of tranquility.
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speech with emotion. We may view speech as without any trace of
emotion-at best, a rarity when matters of politics and government,
self-realization, or social issues are under discussion. 2 5 Alternatively,
we may consider the "limiting case" of speech that is almost, but not• 206-
entirely, lacking emotion. There are no obvious reasons to
qualitatively analyze these two closely neighboring, barely
distinguishable cases differently. Draining the last fragment of emotion
from a nearly, but not entirely, unemotional speech does not trigger any
need to qualitatively revise our analysis of the free speech dimensions
of the case. Going from a nearly emotionless to an entirely emotionless
speech does not add complexity to the free speech analysis of the case.
B. The Model of Emotivism: Speakers, Intent, Listeners, and the
Complexities of Interaction
Our broader and more cognitively inclusive understanding of
emotions should help us to reconsider the free speech cases introduced
above. 207 However, we should do so on the basis of a useful model of
emotional communication in a social context. Speech, after all,
typically requires a speaker and a listener. Both the speaker and the
listener may, in complex and subtle ways, express or react with
emotion.
To appreciate the dynamics of both speakers' and listeners' emotions,
we can draw upon the models of value judgment, 20 8 rationality, and
205. These matters are rarely publicly discussed without some emotion, and, not
coincidentally, they constitute something like the core values or purposes underlying freedom of
speech itself. For discussion, see, for example, Greenawalt, supra note 192, at 125-55.
206. Again, there seems to be no qualitative difference between speech reflecting a very
slight, almost unconscious, emotion of mild tranquility on the one hand, and the same speech
reflecting no detectable emotion at all. If we have a theory for the first kind of free speech case,
we need not significantly revise or complicate that theory to encompass the second.
207. See supra Part 11 (discussing free speech cases involving disorderly conduct, commercial
nude dancing, commercial advertising, and workplace sexual harassment).
208. Emotivism is often thought of, narrowly, as a way of understanding ethical language and
speech, but it may be taken more broadly as referring to all value judgments, and not merely to
ethics. J.O. URMSON, THE EMOTIVE THEORY OF ETHICS 11 (1968) ("The analyses offered by the
emotive theory were intended by most of its proponents to cover all cases of evaluation and not
merely those found in moral contexts."). The contemporary emotivist, or norm-acceptance-
expressivist, Allan Gibbard, is concerned more broadly with rationality and irrationality. See
ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT 7-9,
164, 166 (1990). For discussions of Gibbard's work, see, for example, Justin D'Arms & Daniel
Johnson, Expressivism, Morality, and the Emotions, 104 ETHICS 739 (1994); Paul Horwich,
Gibbard's Theory of Norms, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 67 (1993); Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, The
Many Faces of Gibbard's Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, 103 ETHICS 318 (1993); Nicholas
Sturgeon, Gibbard on Moral Judgment and Norms, 96 ETHICS 22 (1985).
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communication developed by twentieth century209 emotivism. We may
think of emotivism simply as an approach to value, judgment,
rationality, and communication as briefly fleshed out below. 2 10 We
need not be concerned with the overall adequacy or inadequacy of
emotivism in itself.211 Nor do we need to adopt the noncognitivism-
the denial of objectivity in morals-typical of emotivist theories. 212
Instead, we may simply borrow emotivism's emphasis on the
complexities of speaker intent and the dynamics of both speakers and
listeners in the context of emotion and speech. A leading early
emotivist, A.J. Ayer, recognized that "ethical terms do not serve only to
express feeling. They are calculated also to arouse feeling, and so to
stimulate action. ' 213  Emotivism focuses not only on expressing
emotion, but on ways of evoking corresponding emotion in others as
214well. This dual focus on both expressing and evoking in a listener a
corresponding emotion defines emotivism itself.
Emotion, on the part of both speaker and listener, is not, for the
emotivist, merely "a peculiar warm feeling inside us."2 15 The emotivist
209. While emotivism is largely a twentieth century phenomenon, it is not without historical
antecedents. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 6, at 48 (Michael Oakeshott ed.,
Blackwell 1960) (1651) ("[W]hatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it
which he for his part calleth good."); GEOFFREY THOMAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 54
(1993) (discussing David Hume in the context of emotivism).
210. See supra notes 215-21 (discussing the emotivism).
211. For a brief, sophisticated defense of emotivism in a legal context, see Jeremy Waldron,
Moral Truth and Judicial Review, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 75 (1998).
212. See Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Introduction: The Many Moral Realisins, in ESSAYS ON
MORAL REALISM I, 8 (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988); MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL
PROBLEM 16 (1994); Horwich, supra note 208, at 67; see also STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS
CONFLICT xii-xiii (2000) ("I have come to weigh and to appreciate the full force of Hume's
dictum-'Reason both is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions.' Translated into the
linguistic idiom of contemporary philosophy, this dictum becomes-'In moral and political
philosophy one is looking for adequate premises from which to infer conclusions already and
independently accepted because of one's feelings and sympathies."'); Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918) ("No doubt behind these legal lights is the
fighting will of the subject to maintain them, and the spread of his emotions to the general rules
by which they are maintained; but that does not seem to me the same thing as the supposed a
priori discernment of a duty or the assertion of a preexisting right. A dog will fight for his
bone.").
213. ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 108 (2d ed. 1946); see also
CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 21 (1944) (using as a serviceable working
model, "'This is wrong' means I disapprove of this; do so as well") This simple model requires
elaboration, as we often wish to do more in speech than declare right and wrong, or to approve or
disapprove. The various sorts of modalities and contextual uses for language beyond personal
declarations of fight and wrong, such as speaking hypothetically, complicate, but do not crucially
alter, the logic of the emotional speech approach.
214. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 211, at 94.
215. R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 10 (1952).
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can accommodate the modern recognition that emotions are not
reducible to feelings, and can therefore make a place for beliefs,
judgments, and other cognitive elements in emotional expression. 2 16 In
fact, the simple emotivist models can expand to encompass much more
than straightforward personal approvals and disapprovals. They can
also take account of reports of emotions in oneself and in others,
hypothetical and contingent expressions, expressions of regret, requests,
informative statements, expressions of mixed feelings, commands,
interrogatories, and so on. Generally, all of these forms of expression
involve some degree of emotion, or are treatable as limiting cases of
emotional expression. In any event, these kinds of expressions must be
protected to some degree if we are to properly protect the core, central
free speech expressions of one's current emotions. All of these
complications of the basic emotivist model do not change the
underlying analysis.
For the emotivist, then, arguments and discussions between two
persons can certainly involve much more than the unresponsive
volleying of personal feelings. The discussion between speaker and
listener typically does not focus on the mere expression or critique of
feelings. On an emotivist view, the discussion is more likely to focus
on beliefs, or on understanding the relevant facts, 217 and to do so in a
way that directly or indirectly, depending upon context, seeks a sort of
appropriate mutuality, congruence, or agreement in emotion.
As Ayer puts it, in our discussions and debates with others, we often
attempt to show that our interlocutor is wrong about the facts of the
case:
We argue that he has misconceived the agent's motive; or that he has
misjudged the effects of the action; or its probable effects in view of
the agent's knowledge; or that he has failed to take into account the
special circumstances in which the agent was placed. Or else we
employ more general arguments about the effects which actions of a
certain type tend to produce or the qualities which are usually
manifested in their performance. 218
216. See THOMAS, supra note 209, at 53; see also WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 106 (2d
ed. 1973) (noting C.L. Stevenson's recognition that "to a very considerable extent our attitudes
are based on our beliefs, and so can be reasoned about"); R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 4
(1963) ("[I]t is possible for there to be logical relations between prescriptive judgments ....
217. See AYER, supra note 213, atI 11I.
218. Id. Professor William Frankena characterizes C.L. Stevenson's emotivism by stating:
I may favor a certain course of action because I believe it has or will have certain
results. I will then advance the fact that it has these results as an argument in its favor.
But you may argue that it does not have these results, and if you can show this, my
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Thus, the emotivist does not look simply to tastes and preferences in
analyzing the rationality of speech, 219 and certainly not to the tastes and
preferences of the speaker alone. Once again, the simple emotivist
model can be expanded to encompass the various forms of expression
and discussion that do not themselves amount to the expression of the
speaker's own current approval or disapproval. The endless
permutations complicate, but do not qualitatively change, an analysis
focusing on core expressions of approval and disapproval.
Crucially, even in Charles Stevenson's simple emotivist model, there
must be some sort of attempt at achieving what we might call emotional
congruity, mutuality, or concord between speaker and hearer.
Stevenson very roughly summarizes this element in the speaker's
presumed injunction to the hearer to"do so as well.",220 To "do so as
well" is for the hearer to somehow come, in some measure, to join in or
share the speaker's emotion. An attempt at mutuality, or an invitation
to the listener to join with the speaker, is thus an essential part of the
emotivist model.
The emotivist model can easily accommodate crucial references not
only to the speaker and to the listener, and to the speaker's attempt to
achieve mutuality, but also to any consideration that might have some
persuasive or steadying effect on the broadly emotional attitudes,
judgments, or beliefs of the parties. This breadth of reference takes
within its scope any sort of speech that the law might consider
protecting. Nevertheless, as we shall see below,22 1 it is important to
remember that the emotivist model requires an expression of emotion,
coupled with an attempt at inspiring in a listener some appropriate sort
of emotion of a generally shared, concordant, mutual sort.
However, we need not say that only transparent or straightforwardly
conveyed emotion is worthy of protection. Speech that is in some
respects tentative or hypothetical can be protection-worthy. A speaker
who seeks to inspire pride in a listener need not herself always feel or
express pride. Some kinds of deviousness and even strategic deception
may be protection-worthy as well. In this way, the agreement or
harmony sought by the speaker need not always involve a literal match
between the speaker's and the listener's emotions. Regardless, the
speaker must seek some sort of circumstantially appropriate agreement
attitude may change and I may withdraw my judgment that the course of action is right
or good.
FRANKENA, supra note 216, at 106.
219. See GIBBARD, supra note 208, at 166.
220. See STEVENSON, supra note 213, at 21.
221. See infra Part IV (positing an emotion-based approach to the hard free speech cases).
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or attunement of emotions, as expressed, for example, in the speaker's
and the listener's tacit agreement that the listener alone should feel
pride. But, there is an important difference between an agreement that
the listener should feel pride, whatever emotion the speaker feels, and a
situation in which a speaker sadistically evokes fear in the listener,
without seeking any further agreement in emotion or attitude. For
instance, a parent might, in contrast, want a child to feel some mild fear
not literally shared by the parent, but also want a broader, relevant
harmony of attitudes with the child. This differs from seeking merely to
impose or inspire fear in some disliked listener.
IV. AN EMOTION-BASED APPROACH TO THE HARD FREE SPEECH CASES
A. Introduction
At this point, we have seen that the concepts of emotion and
emotional expression are sufficiently rich, cognitive, and diverse to
accommodate all of the elements needed for a general theory of free
speech. Of course, even a sophisticated understanding of emotions and
of their expression will not allow us to arrive at some single
uncontroversial outcome in hard cases. Nevertheless, an emotion-based
approach to free speech offers a fresh and unified understanding of even
the most difficult kinds of free speech cases.
Above, we illustrated some of the problems associated with oral
disorderly conduct cases, 2 22 the commercial nude dancing free
expression cases, 223 the status and appropriate degree of protection for
emotional commercial expression, 224 and with workplace sexual
harassment cases typically involving emotions. 225 Again, no approach
can allow us to resolve all such cases in an uncontroversial way.
Nevertheless, our focus on emotion allows us to intelligently analyze,
classify, and draw useful distinctions among these four kinds of hard
cases. To begin to see how, we should recognize that even if
communication is necessary for a speech to be constitutionally
222. See supra Part Il.A (discussing inconsistent treatment by courts of emotionally charged
"fighting words").
223. See supra Part II.B (discussing disparate constitutional protection for commercial nude
dancing and social dancing).
224. See supra Part II.C (discussing the difficulty in classifying real and false commercial
emotion of corporations for constitutional protection).
225. See supra Part II.D (discussing the conflict between freedom of speech and civil rights in
the workplace in the context of sexual harassment).
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226protected, mere communication in the broadest sense does not
automatically trigger free speech protection. Specifically, as one court
has recognized:
[T]he goal of the First Amendment is to protect expression that
engages in some fashion in public dialogue, that is, "communication
in which the participants seek to persuade, or are persuaded;
communication which is about changing or maintaining beliefs, or
taking or refusing to take action on the basis of one's beliefs .... 227
This language, along with the basic emotivist paradigm discussed
above,2 28 emphasizes that free speech analysis must focus on the
speaker's intent as well as the listener. In applicable cases, this analysis
should emphasize the speaker's lack of genuine emotion or intent to
seek appropriate mutuality or concord. If there is genuine emotion in
the speech, does the speaker also seek a reciprocal, corresponding,
appropriately equivalent emotion on the part of the listener? Speakers
often seek to provoke emotion in a listener-perhaps fear, anxiety,
disgust, hostility, or acquiescence-that does not correspond with,
reciprocate, or validate the speaker's emotion. Verbal intimidation, for
example, would lack this attempt at emotional reciprocity.
Again, this theory, on the basis of a shared tacit or presumed
agreement on the importance of the child's avoiding some danger, does
not seek to leave unprotected the speech of a parent who seeks to inspire
mild, reasonable, appropriate fear in a child. The emotion sought need
not be the same as the emotion felt by the listener. However, an
underlying relevant general emotional harmony must be genuinely
sought. Such speech may be protection-worthy, even if the speaker uses
some form of benign deception.
B. Offensive Epithet and Threat Speech
Let us apply these general considerations to the hard cases discussed
above. 2 29 An emotion-based approach to the offensive epithet speech
case of People v. Dietze 23 may change our view of what seems to be
important in deciding the case. We know from cases such as State v.
226. See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1988)
("An act not intended to be communicative does not acquire the stature of First Amendment-
protected expression merely because someone, upon learning of the act, might derive some
message from it.").
227. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 854 (Cal. 1999) (citations omitted).
228. See supra Part III.B (discussing the emotivism model).
229. See supra Part II (discussing free speech cases involving disorderly conduct, commercial
nude dancing, commercial advertising, and workplace sexual harassment).
230. See supra notes 62-81 and accompanying text (discussing the court's analysis in Dietze).
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Suiter that courts are sometimes willing to deny free speech protection
to emotionally intense speech, in the form of a single epithet, even when
directed at a public authority figure. 2 3 1  How does an emphasis on
emotion change the analysis in Dietze?
The Dietze case involved a mentally retarded complainant and her
mentally retarded son, who were victims of offensive epithets and
apparently credible literal threats of a physical beating at some
unspecified future time. 232  Whatever the speaker's motives for this
behavior, we cannot deny that the speaker in Dietze sought to convey an
evidently strongly charged emotional message, and that the speaker's
message had a strong emotional impact on the hearer-victims. In this
sense, the speech at issue in Dietze may seem centrally protected by an
emotion-based free speech analysis. However, this is not the case. If
we want to say that the speech in Dietze need not be constitutionally
protected, must we do so on the basis of our dislike of the content of the
speaker's message? 233  Should we attempt to merely balance the
emotional or other interests of the speaker and the hearers? Actually, an
emotion-based approach to freedom of speech, along with the emotivist
paradigm discussed above,234 suggests what is crucially missing in the
Dietze analysis.
Our emotion-based account of free speech, as developed and
illustrated in the emotivist model, makes central not only the expression
of emotion by a speaker, but an attempt by the speaker to persuade, or at
least to steady or reinforce the hearer in her relevant attitudes,
judgments, or beliefs. We see this even in the simplest emotivist model,
in which a speaker expresses approval or disapproval of something and
simultaneously, enjoins, urges, or encourages the listener to concur,
share or join in that same approval or disapproval-to "do so as
well."235
On even this simple emotivist model, in which we set aside all of the
complications and references to various kinds of possible mistakes and
231. See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text (discussing how the court distinguished
Suiter and Cohen).
232. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Dietze).
233. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text (referencing the distinction between
content-neutral and content-based restrictions on speech).
234. See supra Part IL.B (discussing the basic principles of the emotivist model).
235. See STEVENSON, supra note 213, at 21 ("This is wrong" as "I disapprove of this; do so as
well" (emphasis deleted)). There is certainly a place for reinforcing one's own beliefs in one's
own mind, but even if this requires a public hearer, it hardly requires the sort of target-victim
found in Dietze.
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other sorts of arguments available to the emotivist,2 36 the speech at
issue in Dietze is missing any real attempt at emotional mutuality or
emotional congruity. There is, as far as we can tell, no real attempt at
persuasion. The victim is not being sincerely encouraged to come to the
belief that she deserves a beating and that she should think of her son as
a dog.
No doubt the crude epithets and threats in Dietze evoke a strong
emotional reaction in their hearers. At the center of this reaction, we
would imagine, would be the continuing emotional fear and anxiety
over the ongoing possibility of being physically beaten in the streets.
This emotional reaction was presumably intended and expected by the
speaker. However, this emotion is not one that the speaker to any
degree shares. The speaker does not fear beating the listener. Nor does
she fear being beaten, either by herself, by the addressees, or by anyone
else. The speech, as far as we can tell, lacks any attempt to arrive at or
inspire, directly or indirectly, any relevant emotional congruity or
mutuality. There is no attempt to convey the emotivist "do so as
well, 237 or specifically to lead the victim to conclude that she rightfully
deserves, for unspecified reasons, a random physical beating. That is,
the speaker is not really seeking to change the listener's anti-beating
emotions into anything remotely congruent with her own pro-beating
emotions.
Thus, a decision not to constitutionally protect the speech in Dietze
does not require us to say that the emotional injury to the victim-
addressees outweighs any interest on the part of the speaker. This sort
of emotional interest balancing might well motivate a decision to
decline to protect the speech. Instead, we can say that the speech in
Dietze should be unprotected for free speech purposes because it is
crucially, structurally deficient. The speech apparently lacks any
attempt 238 at emotional mutuality, at a "do so as well" element,
regardless of how much emotion is expressed or intentionally inspired
in the hearer.
236. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (referencing the emotivist's need during
discussions with others to attempt to show the other party that his or her view is wrong).
237. See supra notes 213, 220, 224 and accompanying text (discussing the mutuality aspects
of the emotivist "to do so as well" model).
238. Obviously, we would not want to penalize speech that seeks some such mutuality or
persuasiveness, but simply fails to achieve that purpose. Speech that turns out not to be
persuasive or to inspire mutuality, despite the speaker's intent, should not be penalized.
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C. Commercial Nude Dancing and Protected Speech
A dramatically contrasting set of issues is raised in the case of
commercial barroom nude dancing, as discussed above.2 39  In Dietze,
we could fairly assume that the emotions felt by both speaker and
hearers were intense and, more importantly, genuine. The genuineness
of a purportedly straightforward emotional communication, the first
element of the basic emotivist paradigm, in commercial nude dancing is
open to doubt, more so than in some event-based, celebratory,
spontaneous, uninhibited social dancing. 24  Social dancing often
displays the collective expression of genuine emotion, including
exuberance or celebration. Consider the phenomenon of dancing in the
street at the overthrow of a despised tyrant, or even at the defeat of a
traditional football rival. Whether some such potentially shared
communicative emotion characterizes social dancing that occurs on no
special occasion is admittedly a closer question.
In any event, we might well be skeptical of the claim that commercial
nude dancing invariably fits all the elements of our emotional speech
communication paradigm. Must we assume that, in accordance with the
emotivist paradigm, dancers genuinely approve or believe in whatever
erotic emotional message they are communicating to their paying
customers? There is, in a sense, certainly more congruence between the
emotion-inducing nude dance and the emotions experienced by the
customers than we found in the offensive, insulting speech cases. But
can we just assume that the commercial nude dancer believes in, wants
to communicate, and wants the customers to be persuaded by or to
adopt her erotically emotional message? Is it possible that some
dancers have no emotional message that they wish to propagate or
reinforce through their dancing? Do all paid employees who interact
with customers actually believe in their message? Can we say that such
cases are like that of a parent who wishes to inspire mild fear in a child
without feeling that particular emotion herself, based on a real desire for
an agreement with the child, now or in the future, about the danger?
239. See supra Part II.B (discussing the lack of rationale for the constitutional distinction
between nude dancing and social dancing).
240. Speech that superficially appears to attempt to express some emotion, but which does not
actually attempt to convey that emotion, perhaps because the speaker does not genuinely feel,
endorse, or approve of the emotion, now or on any other occasion, and without any appropriate
explanation, misses the first element of the basic emotivist paradigm. See supra notes 213, 220,
224 and accompanying text (discussing the first element of the basic emotivist communicative
paradigm). Contrast the efforts, often successful, at shared, mutual, emotionally expressive
communication in the New York City and London celebrations of Victory in Europe ("V-E")
Day. See generally MARTIN GILBERT, THE DAY THE WAR ENDED-VICTORY IN EUROPE
(1995).
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Perhaps our focus on the dancer's intent to convey an emotional
message on the part of the dancer is misplaced. For free speech
purposes, perhaps the commercial nude dancer should be considered as
the means through which the bar owner intends to convey to and
persuade customers of an erotically emotional message of some sort.
Once again, we can set aside as irrelevant to the message being
conveyed the complications of questioning, of commanding, of
hypothetical or contingent preferences, and so forth. It seems entirely
possible that neither the owner nor the hired dancer believes in any
relevant emotional message or wishes to persuasively propagate or
reinforce such a message. Arguably, for the club owner and hired
dancer, the only real intent, short or long-term, is to induce the transfer
of wealth from paying customers to the owner or dancer in a way that is
thought to have some advantages over other means of obtaining money.
This is not to suggest that speech motivated in substantial measure by
a desire to make a profit disqualifies the speech from constitutional
protection. 24 1 However, if in a given case it is admitted or sufficiently
established that commercial barroom nude dancing is really only a way
of separating customers from their money, an emotion-based account of
freedom of speech can sensibly decline to extend free speech protection.
In such a case, we may have drifted too far away from the basic
emotional speech model.
D. Emotion-Based Commercial Advertising
What can we say, then, about purportedly emotion-based commercial
advertising in general, as discussed separately above? 242  Can we
assume that when Bad Frog Brewery greets us with a contemptuous,
insulting, or loosely "obscene" hand gesture, the corporation is
attempting to convey the emotion of contempt for persons, including
prospective purchasers? Surely, in a highly fragmented post-modem
market, expressing the emotion of contempt even for one's own
audience can occasionally be an effective marketing strategy. However,
are we also to assume that Bad Frog Brewery, whom we shall assume to
be, in some capacity, capable of genuine emotion, intended that a
generalized expression of contempt for persons including prospective
purchasers would actually come to be shared and agreed with by many
of those prospective purchasers?
241. From the New York Times standpoint, a typical paid advertisement is largely intended to
raise revenues and is presumably protected speech. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text (quoting Sullivan).
242. See supra Part II.C (discussing the difficulty in classifying commercial emotional
expressions for constitutional purposes).
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Bad Frog Brewery can insist that it meets the emotivist paradigm
through a hand gesture intended not in any negative sense, but as "a
symbol of peace, solidarity, and good will. ' 243 Perhaps this is so, but
can we simply assume that Bad Frog Brewery genuinely intended by its
logo to reverse the standard meaning of a familiar gesture? Is it equally
plausible that Bad Frog Brewery's corporate emotions actually center
on neither widespread expression of contempt nor on general amity nor
an implausible means of ushering in Utopia?
Just as the owner of a bar featuring commercial nude dancing may
care predominantly about income rather than having customers agree to
any particular emotional message, the Bad Frog Brewery may see the
content of its logo, advertising, and other marketing as techniques in
inspiring purchase by whatever consumer market segment it has
targeted. After all, in a competitive marketplace, the company that
focuses unduly on sending shared social messages, as opposed to
messages inducing eventual purchases, is unlikely to survive long
enough to pass along its communicative priorities. 244
In such cases, an emotion-based approach to free speech must be
skeptical of the claim that the corporate speaker wishes both to express
a genuine emotion and to somehow inspire the corresponding, and thus
shared, emotion within its targeted consumers. This is certainly a
possible description of some advertising and marketing, but hardly all.
Where the speech at issue is legally found to depart dramatically from
the basic emotivist and other satisfactory emotional speech paradigms,
we have correspondingly far less reason to extend constitutional
protection to such speech.
Obviously, many different forms of commercial speech exist. Not all
need be judged alike. Where commercial speech touts a known
dangerous or ineffective product, we may conclude that the speaker is
not seeking any sort of relevant congruence of emotion with the market.
However, even if the commercial speaker in a dangerous product case
really seeks such congruence and expresses the relevant emotions, we
can still extend appropriate free speech protection while appropriately
regulating or prohibiting sales. This alternative solution will often be a
243. See supra notes 213, 220, 224 and accompanying text (discussing the first element of the
basic emotivist communicative paradigm); supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the
brewery's claims).
244. This is not to suggest that in our overcrowded, fragmented, intense, post-modern
marketplace, sending controversial or ultimately ambiguous messages can never be a successful
marketing strategy. See WRIGHT, supra note 109, at 135-55 (discussing the role of intentionally
controversial advertisements).
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sensible legal response where the commercial speaker is unaware of any
defects of, and genuinely "believes in," the product.
E. Workplace Sexual Harassment and Free Speech
In the commercial advertising context, it is useful to wonder whether
any purported emotion is at all genuine. In contrast, we may assume
that generally, the emotions at issue in the workplace sexual harassment
cases discussed above 245 are genuine and often intense. Nevertheless,
as we have seen in connection with our discussion of offensive epithet
speech,246 intensity of emotion, without more, does not suffice for a
strong case worthy of free speech protection.247
Not all sexually emotional speech 248 in the workplace will inspire
negative emotional reactions in the way we would expect of typical
offensive epithet speech. Some sexually emotional workplace speech
may be received with, at least, indifference. 249  Often, the hearer of
sexually emotional speech disagrees with the content of the speech at
issue. Nevertheless, on many occasions, to say that the hearer-victim
disagrees with the content of the speech grossly distorts the nature and
content of the harassing speech.
Some sexually oriented workplace speech is, by intention or at least
predictably, an emotional imposition on the hearer-victim. 250  It is
sensible to hold that workplace verbal sexual harassment often inflicts
various kinds of injuries that outweigh any free speech interests at stake.
Where verbal sexual harassment is concerned, as in the general
245. See supra Part II.D (discussing several examples of emotionally charged language
involved in sexual harassment cases).
246. See supra Parts II.A, IV.B (discussing treatment of offensive speech in prior case law
and under the emotion-based approach).
247. See supra Part IV.B (arguing that no constitutional protection should be afforded to
offensive speech that does not involve emotional mutuality or congruity between the speaker and
the listener).
248. Our focus here on sexually emotional speech is not meant in the slightest to deny that
underlying explicitly sexual speech may be the assertion of and quest for various forms
of workplace power, dominance, and control. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and
Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. I,
4, 43 (1999).
249. The courts make some effort to distinguish welcomeness or indifference, however
constrained, from unwelcomeness of sexually oriented speech in the workplace. See, e.g., Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
250. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem
of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 735 (1997) (discussing how workplace
speech can be burdensome because the environment compels "close and ongoing personal
engagement").
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offensive speech cases, 25 1 it would be possible to judicially engage in
such an interest balancing process. 252  However, there should be an
alternative to interest balancing in workplace sexual harassment cases.
Much verbal sexual harassment is emotionally charged, with the
emotional content usually being obvious. The emotional reactions of
the target-hearer may be strong and predictable. Nevertheless, an
emotion-based theory of free speech should require more than just an
emotional intent and a provoked emotional response in accordance with
the models discussed above. 253 In particular, we should require that the
speech amount to an attempt not merely to provoke some sort of fearful,
disgusted, angry, or disappointed reaction, but some sort of appropriate
emotional mutuality, congruence, consonance, or agreement. We need
not leave open to penalty, however, speech that amounts to a failed, but
genuine, attempt at such relevant mutuality. 254 Speech that is not, under
the circumstances, reasonably interpretable as aiming at any such
mutuality crucially lacks what we have referred to as the "do so as well"
element of the basic emotivist model 255 and is in this sense radically,
structurally deficient.
A great deal of the sexually-oriented workplace speech is predictably
unpersuasive to bystanders 25 and not even plausibly intended to bring
the target-hearer's emotional attitudes into any sort of consonance with
those of the speaker. After all, it is not uncommon for such harassing
speech to continue well after the harasser has been confronted and has
promised to refrain.257  We may reasonably assume, though, that a
harasser would not continue to badger his or her own direct supervisor
on any matter once the harasser has been told that the supervisor wants
the matter dropped. Thus, it is fair to conclude that much harassing
speech is not genuinely intended to somehow miraculously convert an
obviously unwelcoming victim. No matter how reflective of the
251. See supra Part HI.A (discussing the Court's rationale in Suiter and Dietze and problems
with those approaches).
252. See supra Part IV.B (illustrating an emotion-based approach to deciding Dietze).
253. See supra notes 213, 220, 224 and accompanying text (discussing the mutuality of
emotion essential to the emotivist model).
254. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of attempt at emotional
mutuality in Dietze).
255. See supra notes 213, 220, 224 and accompanying text (discussing the mutuality of
emotion element in the basic emotivist communicative paradigm).
256. See Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 71, 98 (1996).
257. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993); Shanoff v. Ill. Dep't of
Human Servs., 258 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[Rlepeated incidents of verbal harassment
that continue despite the employee's objections are indicative of a hostile environment.").
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harasser's own emotions, such speech need not be constitutionally
protected under our analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
We have considered emotional speech, and what can appear to be
emotional speech, as well as various sorts of emotional reactions to
speech. Centrally, we have focused on the scope and nature of
emotions25 8 and on an emotivist model of communication. 259 We have
also applied our understandings to four difficult emotional speech
260contexts: offensive epithet and threat speech, commercial nude
dancing as speech, 2 6 1 purportedly emotion-based or emotion-provoking
commercial advertising, 262 and emotionally-based workplace sexual
harassment speech.263
Our general study of emotion and communication leads to the
surprising conclusion that, given the remarkable breadth, subtlety,
varied cognitivity, and inclusiveness of the idea of emotion, an emotion-
based approach to speech, if fully developed, could actually produce a
full account, albeit inevitably uncertain and controversial, of the scope
264and limits of freedom of speech. More specifically, our model of free
speech allows us to question the scope of free speech protection
accorded in the four particular contexts discussed above. 265  In some
commercial contexts, for example, it is reasonable to ask whether there
is any genuine intent on the part of the commercial speaker to express
and communicate a genuine emotional message at all. If the intent to
express or even report a genuine emotion is absent, we may say that the
speech in question inexcusably fails to meet the first element of the
simple emotivist paradigm and is thus structurally defective. 266  If,
258. See supra Part III.A (discussing the historical development of views of emotions).
259. See supra Part III.B (discussing the basic rationale underlying the emotion-based
approach to free speech).
260. See supra Parts H.A, IV.B (discussing the treatment of offensive speech by courts and
the treatment under the emotivist approach).
261. See supra Parts I.B, IV.C (discussing the court's analysis and the emotivist approach to
expression in commercial nude dancing).
262. See supra Parts II.C, IV.D (discussing the nuances of treating emotional expression in
commercial advertising for free speech purposes).
263. See supra Parts II.D, IV.E (discussing the court's analysis of emotional expression in
sexual harassment cases and applying the emotion-based approach to the same cases).
264. See supra Parts III.A-B (explaining basic theories of emotions and the emotivist model
in the context of free speech protection).
265. See supra Part II (discussing free speech cases involving disorderly conduct, commercial
nude dancing, commercial advertising, and workplace sexual harassment).
266. See supra Parts III.A-B (explaining basic theories of emotions and the emotivist model
in the context of free speech protection).
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additionally, the speech cannot be characterized as cognitive, as the
limiting or minimalist case of emotional speech, there is ample logic in
denying the commercial speech constitutional protection.
On the other hand, under our model, in some contexts, verbal offense,
threat, or harassment is structurally defective for missing not the first,
but the second, element of the basic emotivist paradigm 267-the attempt
to achieve or reinforce some sort of general mutuality, concord,
harmony, or attunement between speaker and hearer based on relevant
persuasion of the hearer. 268  Such speech, thus, need not be
constitutionally protected.
An emotion-based approach to freedom of speech allows us to
address all of the significant aspects of freedom of speech in a unified
manner. On such a basis, we can appropriately extend or limit the scope
of free speech protection269 without unnecessarily denying that the
expression at issue is speech at all and without unnecessarily engagingin interest balancing.
267. See supra notes 213, 220, 224 and accompanying text, along with Part III.B more
generally, for a discussion of the mutuality of emotion essential in the emotivist model.
268. See supra Parts 1II.B, IV.B, IV.E (discussing examples of cases where emotional
expression lacks general mutuality between speaker and hearer).
269. See supra Parts IV.B-E (applying an emotion-based approach to cases of offensive
speech, commercial nude dancing, emotional commercial advertising, and workplace sexual
harassment).
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